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Abstract
The Arab uprisings threatened authoritarian states across the Arab world with unprecedented levels
of mobilization. The nature of these challenges, the states’ responses and the outcomes have been,
however, markedly uneven. In accounting for this divergence, while some approaches have
examined the structural preconditions for transitions, others have emphasized the impact of
interactions between different political actors. This thesis draws on both approaches through
examining how the state’s institutional structure shapes the opportunities and constraints
of states in employing different authoritarian strategies. It examines why and how different
regimes have used different authoritarian strategies to survive and stabilize. In responding to
threats of instability, some states use measures of legitimation through concessions and
accommodations, others use measures of cooptation through including strategic actors into the
regime elite, while some resort to repression, whether through physical violence or restrictions
of political and civil rights. The thesis uses Michael Herb’s regime typology and uses Saudi
Arabia, Morocco and Egypt as its cases to examine how different institutional structures reinforce
the choice of strategy. Through comparing state responses across cases and across time for each
case, the thesis explains how authoritarian strategies vary across different regimes and across time
for each regime. The thesis concludes by analyzing the costs and benefits of different authoritarian
strategies and how they contribute to different patterns of stability.
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Introduction
The Arab uprisings threatened authoritarian states across the Arab region with unprecedented
levels of oppositional mobilization. The nature of these challenges, the states’ responses and their
outcomes have been, however, markedly uneven. The thesis structurally examines why and how
different regimes use different authoritarian strategies to survive and stabilize. While accounting
for the role of societal actors, the thesis focuses on how state institutions and politics from above
shaped different elite response, resulting in different patterns of stability. The thesis, therefore,
asks how regime types, as an independent variable, condition the state’s survival strategy, as a
dependent variable, thereby creating path dependencies which influence the state’s capacity to
stabilize when confronted with challenges.
The thesis takes the Arab uprisings as a critical juncture, since they constitute the most series recent
challenge to the survival of states across the Arab world. The thesis analyzes the historical survival
strategies used by different regime types and how the state’s structural institutional structure
influenced the choice of strategy. The thesis then examines how states reflecting different regime
types responded to protests during the Arab uprisings. This examination of the intraregional
variation of authoritarian survival strategy allows for a comparison between strategies across
different regime types, as well as a comparison of survival strategy within each regime prior to
and after the uprisings. In addition to identifying how regime types are significant in influencing
different patterns of stabilization, by linking different regime types with different survival
strategies, this thesis contributes to examinations of which regimes use which mechanism of
authoritarian reproduction and why. The thesis shows that the choice of survival strategy is guided
by the incentives and constraints involved in using the strategy, which are, in turn, shaped by the
thesis’s independent variable of regime type.
6

For survival strategies, the thesis relies on the theoretical framework used by Gerschewski in which
states use a mixture of repression, cooptation and legitimation for survival. 1 Authoritarian states
have traditionally relied on repression for achieving stability. However, with pressures to
democratize, authoritarian states have adopted measures that legitimize their rule through
measures of limited liberalization as well as greater concessions and accommodation.
Authoritarian states have also used measures of cooptation to include potentially threatening actors
within the political system actors to limit their opposition. While some sources use cooptation and
legitimation interchangeably, Gerschewski’s framework separates them, which can provide a more
refined analysis. The thesis shows that states need to maintain their adaptability in this repertoire
of strategies in order to achieve stability.
For regime type, the thesis uses the typology of Lucas and Herb. 2 Previous studies have examined
the issue of monarchical exceptionalism during the Arab uprisings as monarchies have been
confronted with limited challenges relative to republics. This thesis goes beyond traditional
explanations of monarchical resilience that focus on culture and rentierism to examine the impact
of the institutional structure of the state on mechanisms of survival. Moreover, while the distinction
between monarchies and republics has been previously explored in the literature, 3 there has been
a gap in examinations of variation within the monarchies themselves. This thesis tests whether the
assumption of the homogeneity of monarchies in the region holds when examining the different
strategies adopted during the Arab uprisings or, instead, whether the distinction proposed proves

Gerschewski, Johannes. "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes." Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13-38.
2
Herb, Michael. All in the family: absolutism, revolution, and democracy in Middle Eastern monarchies. SUNY
Press, 1999; Lucas, Russell E. "Monarchical authoritarianism: Survival and political liberalization in a Middle Eastern
regime type." International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, no. 1 (2004): 103-119.
3
Lucas, Russell E. "Monarchies and protests in the Arab uprisings: Path dependencies or political
opportunities?." Journal of Arabian Studies 4, no. 2 (2014): 195-213.
1
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that significant differences within monarchies need to be considered. Accordingly, using Herb’s
typology, this thesis divides monarchies into two categories: dynastic and linchpin monarchies.
This typology reflects different economic and institutional structures. Using this typology, the
thesis will examine how Gerschewski’s three strategies of repression, cooptation and legitimation
correspond to each of the three regime types of republics, linchpin and dynastic monarchies.

Methodology and Case Selection
This thesis uses a comparative case-study approach and relies on macro-historical data. The thesis
builds most substantially on analyses by De Mesquita and Smith, Scheitzer, Brownlee et al., Bellin,
Josua & Edel and Lacroix et al.. 4 The thesis adopts a macro-level focus with states as the unit of
analysis. The thesis sets a framework for countries that witnessed protests across the Arab region
and examines the state’s response to analyze the cost-benefit analysis guiding the decision to
control the challenge to its stability. The thesis examines the historical survival strategies of
regimes in the region as well as survival strategies during 2011-12, which is when several Arab
states were confronted with varying levels of protests and had to implement measures to contain
them.

De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, and Alastair Smith. "Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government
finance." American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 4 (2010): 936-950;
Gerschewski, Johannes. "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes." Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13-38
Scheitzer, Bertold. “Modelling Mechanisms of Democratic Transition in the Arab Uprisings,” Middle East
Critique24, no. 1 (2015), pp. 44-66;
Josua, Maria, and Mirjam Edel. "To repress or not to repress—regime survival strategies in the Arab spring."
Terrorism and Political Violence 27, no. 2 (2015): 289-309
Brownlee, Jason, Tarek E. Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. The Arab Spring: Pathways of repression and reform.
Oxford University Press, USA, 2014
Lacroix, Zoltan Barany Stéphane, Peter M. Lewis, Sheri Berman, and Stephan Ortmann. "Comparing the Arab
Revolts." Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011)
Bellin, Eva. "The robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in comparative perspective."
Comparative politics (2004): 139-157.
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Even though the framework constructed by the thesis can be applied to many of the Arab states
that were challenged by protests, the thesis selectively focuses on three cases, which reflect the
different regime types. Building on Herb’s typology, the first category is that of dynastic, oilmonarchies, which includes the Gulf kingdoms of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the
UAE. For an oil-based, dynastic monarchy, the thesis focuses on Saudi Arabia. Despite the relative
proliferation of oil-monarchies in the region, only a handful of oil-monarchies – Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait - witnessed protests. Furthermore, contrary to republics, and, except for
Bahrain, those who witnessed protests experienced only minor challenges. This, in addition to
demonstrating the uneven spread of revolutionary unrest, suggests that cultural, geopolitical, and
institutional factors explain this monarchical resilience and the low level of mobilization they
faced. Even though Bahrain has witnessed protests on a more massive scale than Saudi Arabia,
stability in Bahrain was achieved through the impact of external intervention. Since this thesis
focuses on the role of the state’s own survival strategies, the case of Bahrain will not serve its
purpose. Furthermore, Bahrain stands as an anomaly among dynastic monarchies given its status
as a minority-dominated political system, which has resulted in relatively low levels of legitimacy
for the monarch.
The second category is that of non-oil, linchpin monarchies and it includes the kingdoms of Jordan
and Morocco, with Oman falling in between these two categories. From this category, the thesis
focuses on Morocco. Both cases of linchpin monarchies share a variety of similarities in the nature
of protests as well as in the state’s response to the protests. In this category, the monarch, rather
than the royal family as in the first category, plays the leading role in decision-making and in
balancing between different institutions. Even though there are similarities between these two
categories of monarchies such as their use of religious legitimacy in delegitimizing the opposition,
9

this classification can enable the examinations of the role of oil as well as different institutional
settings within shaping how the state responds to protests.
For the third and final case of republics, the thesis explores Egypt. Unlike monarchies, several
republics have witnessed major protests, which are: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Algeria,
Iraq, and Sudan. For Libya, Yemen and Syria, the outbreak of civil war demonstrates the
breakdown of survival strategies. Since cases of civil war represent different contextual and
institutional settings, the thesis uses republics that have not experienced civil wars. By focusing
on these cases, and while accounting for the different levels of threat, the thesis can disaggregate
and analyze how differences in these regimes led to different choices of survival strategies.

Conceptualization and Operationalization
For the independent variables, in defining “regime”, rather than referring to the leader or
government in power, the thesis uses it to indicate the sets of formal and informal rules and
institutions that are used to select leaders and policies. 5 A regime, therefore, goes beyond formal
institutional arrangements to refer the rules of the political game. Regimes can be altered when the
leader or government change, but they can also survive through a change in leadership. Since
regimes impact patterns of governance, they also shape the state’s mechanisms for the
reproduction of power. In examining how different regimes produce different political structures,
this thesis focuses on variables of rentierism and dynasticism as the main paradigms explaining
the monarchy-republic distinction.
While each of these paradigms offers explanatory leverage in explaining different patterns of
stability, they suffer from inconsistencies which stems from failing to study how they impact

5

Dahl, Robert A. Regimes and oppositions. No. 320.9 R4. 1973.
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stability. For example, Herb has argued that non-dynastic monarchies are potentially unstable. In
explaining how linchpin monarchies have survived previous challenges, he has ascribed them to
elements of luck. However, the continuing success in stabilization strategies of Morocco and
Jordan’s suggests that further research is required. Similarly, the rentierism theory has emphasized
the role oil contributes to authoritarian resilience. However, there is a number of oil-rich states
such as Iraq and Libya suffer from instability despite their abundant rent revenues, which suggests
that rentierism requires further mechanisms to establish stability. Through combining the two
approaches, this thesis provides a more nuanced account for how these different variables interact
and how different regimes stabilize.
Furthermore, in defining a monarchy as oil-rich, this thesis relies on the definition of Beblawi &
Luciani. 6 According to their definition, a rentier state refers to a state that accrues its revenues
predominantly from rent relative to the domestic productive sector. In such a state, the working
population is excluded from the generation of rent, leaving the state as the primary recipient of this
revenue.
For the dependent variable of authoritarian strategy, the thesis relies on that of Gerschewski who
synthesizes different strands of research on autocracies to propose an analytical framework that
captures the mechanisms that explain the resilience of autocracies 7. According to him, there are
three pillars that autocratic regimes develop to stabilize their regimes. The first pillar, legitimation,
can be achieved through appeals to norms and values of a society, but it can also include measures
of partially liberalization and concessions. The second pillar, cooptation, defines “the capacity to

Beblawi, Hazem Al and Luciani, Giacomo, 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., The Arab
State, London, Routledge, p. 87-88
7
Gerschewski, Johannes. "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes." Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13-38.
6
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tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite.” 8 Whether through formal
or informal channels, cooptation can include actors through the distribution of material resources
well as diffusion of political power. 9
Finally, for the third pillar, repression refers to incidents of one-sided use of violence by the
incumbent government to increase its likelihood of survival. 10 Repression encompasses a broader
variety of actions than violence. More than the use of physical force, repression can involve threats
and can be achieved through institutional means as well. In defining the non-physical aspects of
repression, Wintrobe defines repression as:
"restrictions on the rights of citizens to criticize the government, restrictions on the freedom
of the press, restrictions on the rights of opposition parties to campaign against the
government, or, as is common in totalitarian dictatorship, the outright prohibition of
groups, associations, or political parties opposed to the government." 11
Repression, by definition, is exercised by legitimate actors of the government such as the military,
police, and mercenaries. Repressive behavior also often violates human rights and is considered
as human rights abuse. Moreover, even though repression has been used synonymously with
coercion, coercion need not be repressive since coercion can be used to deter violence.

Gerschewski, Johannes. "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes." Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13-38.
9
Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. "Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships." Economics
& Politics 18, no. 1 (2006): 1-26.
10
Bove, Vincenzo, Jean-Philippe Platteau, and Petros G. Sekeris. "Political repression in autocratic regimes."
Journal of Comparative Economics 45, no. 2 (2015): 410-428.
11
Wintrobe, Ronald. The political economy of dictatorship. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
8
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In operationalizing repression, it is most commonly disaggregated into high-intensity, or harsh,
and low-intensity, or soft repression. 12 High-intensity repression focuses on visible instances of
violent coercion used against mass demonstrations, campaigns against dissidents and so on. This
includes acts of imprisonment, killing, forced disappearances, and house arrest. On the other hand,
low-intensity repression focuses on non-violent, more subtle restrictions of civil and political
liberties, such as restricting assembly and freedom of expression, surveillance, harassment, and
intimidation. While the two forms of repression are interlinked, they serve different purposes.
Whereas low-intensity repression raises the costs of collection action and can have a preemptive
effect, high-intensity repression is targeted at those who have a high capacity of collection action
and are identified as immediate threats.

Chapters Overview
This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter begins by situating the concept of
authoritarian survival strategies within the broader theoretical approaches to authoritarianism. It
follows by applying this theoretical framework to the Arab world while examining traditional
paradigms explaining authoritarian resilience in the region. The next three chapters examine the
historical patterns of survival strategies employed by each case. They then examine the nature and
level of the protests in the selected cases, how they were shaped by regime’s institutions and how
the state has responded. Finally, in chapter five, the thesis concludes by examining the implications
and limitations of the thesis’s findings and whether the Arab uprisings changed the traditional tools
of survival in the region.

Way, Lucan A., and Steven Levitsky. "The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the Cold War." Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (2006): 387-410.
12

13
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
1.1. Theoretical Approaches to Authoritarianism
This chapter begins by situating authoritarian survival strategies within the broader theoretical
literature on authoritarian regimes. This is followed by examining the impact of regime types on
survival strategies. The chapter then applies these frameworks to the Arab world while the
following chapters examine how each regime type within the Arab world reflects different
repertoires of strategies.
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence in theoretical and methodological approaches to
examining authoritarian regimes. 13 However, while much of this resurgence has focused on
authoritarian political institutions, there continues to be a gap in explaining mechanisms guiding
the behavior and decision-making patterns of authoritarian states. In integrating historical
approaches explaining the endurance of authoritarian regimes, Gerschewski identifies three
research waves of research on autocracy, each reflecting the configuration of autocratic regimes
of its time. 14 The first is the totalitarianism paradigm, which started in the 1930s and lasted until
the mid-1960s. This paradigm focused on the role of ideology and terror as the main characteristics
of totalitarian states. 15 By the 1960s, the totalitarianism paradigm was fading as the changing
nature of authoritarian states created a need for a new paradigm. Linz conceptualized
authoritarianism as a distinct form of regime type that is neither a democratic nor a totalitarian

13
De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno. The logic of political survival. MIT press, 2005; Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam
Przeworski. "Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships." Economics & Politics 18, no. 1 (2006): 126; Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War.
Cambridge University Press, 2010; Geddes, Barbara. "What do we know about democratization after twenty
years?." Annual review of political science 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144; Acemoglu, Daron, and James A.
Robinson. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge University Press, 2005.
14
Gerschewski, Johannes. "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic
regimes." Democratization 20, no. 1 (2013): 13-38.
15
Arendt, Hannah. The origins of totalitarianism. Vol. 244. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973.
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state 16. Despite critiques on its drawbacks, 17 Juan J. Linz’s definition of authoritarianism has
become a reference point in debates within the field. According to Linz, a state is authoritarian if
it has:
limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but
with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except
at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group
exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones. 18
While the second wave spawned several approaches, its main explanatory variables were socioeconomic factors, with the use mainly of small-N comparisons and case studies. Thus, in
examining military regimes in Latin America, O’Donnell theorized that bureaucratic elites have
emerged from import substitution policies. 19 With collusion between the military and bureaucratic
elites, authoritarian states were consolidated as they formed a coup coalition that stabilized the
regime. Similar frameworks were used to explain authoritarianism in other regions. In the Arab
world, authoritarianism was attributed to the emergence of neo-patrimonial rule and a “social
contract” between the rulers and the ruled. 20
While this strand persisted, by the 1990s, influenced by rational choice and neo-institutionalist
approaches, the third paradigm was examining the emerging role of institutions and strategies of

Linz, J.J. (1964) “An Authoritarian Regime: Spain,” in Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems: Contributions to
Comparative Political Sociology (eds E. Allardt, Y. Littunen). Helsinki: Transactions of the Westermarck Society, pp.
294–341.
17
Snyder, Richard (2006) “Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Non-democratic Regimes,” in
Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition (ed. Andreas Schedler). Boulder, CO : Lynne
Rienner, pp. 219–231; Hadenius, A., and J. Teorell (2006) Authoritarian Regimes: Stability, Change, and Pathways
to Democracy, 1972–2003 . Notre Dame, IN: Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
18
Linz, Juan José. Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.
19
O'Donnell, Guillermo A. Bureaucratic authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in comparative perspective. Univ
of California Press, 1988.
20
Beblawi, Hazem, and Giacomo Luciani, eds. The rentier state. Routledge, 2015.
16
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repression and cooptation in stabilizing authoritarian regimes. With the shortcomings of
democratic consolidation in third-wave countries, the transition paradigm’s assumption that
democratization is inevitable came under attack as empirical reality showed otherwise. 21 With
partial liberalization, rather than democratize, authoritarian regimes used institutions such as
parties, elections, and so on to mediate intra-elite conflicts and coopt opposition, thereby
consolidating and stabilizing their rule. 22 This has been demonstrated in the Arab world. Despite
Arab states being defined as authoritarian regimes, most have had political parties, held regular
elections, and enjoyed some degree of liberal freedom since the 1980s 23.
Given the increasing sophistication with which authoritarian leaders employed different strategies
to prolong their rule, a growing debate emerged to classify regimes in the grey zone between
democracy and authoritarianism. Several scholars have devised typologies that can be used to
explain patterns of stability in different types of authoritarian states. For example, Geddes,
focusing on the state’s institutional structures and actors, has distinguished authoritarian regimes
into single-party, military, and personalist regimes. 24 She demonstrated the significance of regime
type through her findings that single party regimes are more robust than military regimes or
personalistic regimes, as parties seem to have a stabilizing effect on autocratic rule. The
relationship between regimes and authoritarian strategies is examined further in the next section.

21

Carothers, Thomas. "The end of the transition paradigm." Journal of democracy 13, no. 1 (2002): 5-21.

Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions”, 1293; also see Gandhi, Political Institution under
Dictatorship.
23
Bakis, J. Karakoç, and Jülide Karakoç. Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Before and After the Arab
Uprisings. Springer, 2015.
22

Geddes, Barbara. "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?." Annual review of political
science 2, no. 1 (1999): 115-144.
24
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1.2. Regimes and Authoritarian Strategies of Survival
Influenced by third wave approaches, various theories have examined the incentives and
constraints facing authoritarian regimes in maintaining stability. According to Gerschewski,
authoritarian states maintain stability through a combination of repression, cooptation, and
legitimation. In examining their choice of strategy, Davenport argues for examining the factors
that “influence the political leader’s’ cost-benefit analysis”. 25 The choice of survival strategy,
therefore, relies on the country's given set of opportunities and constraints. Different types of
authoritarian regimes face different sets, which derive from the regime’s political and economic
structure shaping the leader’s perception of stability and his/her cost-benefit analysis. While there
are several variables that frame this set of opportunities and constraints, this thesis focuses on the
role of regime type as the primary factor that shapes the state’s institutional structure.
Regimes are products of complex processes of historical evolution and structural conditions. While
several studies have examined the impact of regimes on economic performance, there continues
to be a gap in theorizing on the relationship between regimes and survival strategies. This gap in
the literature may be attributed to the difficulty involved in examining the decision-making
processes within closed regimes. Moreover, whereas extensive research has been conducted on the
differences in stabilization strategies between democracies and authoritarian regimes, fewer
research has examined this variation within different types of authoritarian regimes. Thus, there
continues to be a gap in examining the connection between different state institutions and the
incentives and constraints for different tools of stabilization.

25

Davenport, Christian. "State repression and political order." Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 10 (2007): 1-23.
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Given that the state’s defining feature is in its legitimate use of coercion, 26 repression represents
the basic, rational strategy for the maintenance of control, staying in power and perpetuating the
status quo and is most often used in quelling popular dissent. This is derived from the axiom that
governments seek to remain in office and often face a high risk of being deposed. 27 Repression is
particularly used when the regime faces an overt challenge or a threat to its survival, particularly
internal dissent. While there are challenges other than popular mobilization such as coups or even
non-oppositional threats such as elections, repression has been used most specifically in subduing
internal dissent, given its immediacy and its likelihood of spreading and escalating into a
revolution. According to Ritter and Conrad, repression can be preemptive or responsive. 28 If the
government can repress preemptively, then dissent isn’t observed. However, if repression is
responsive, then dissent is observed.
In contrast to the repressive abuse in totalitarian regimes, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that
repression is used strategically until an “optimal” degree, after which it becomes counterproductive
for stability 29. Moreover, they argue that, if there is a credible threat of revolution, then the elite
may democratize, which would lead to a commitment to redistribution for the masses. 30 This
account, however, should also recognize the possibility of cooptation as a viable strategy for the
government to delay democratization. Thus, in addition to repression, governments use different
accommodative measures in dealing with internal dissent such as cooptation, which would bring

Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation. Fortress Press, 1965.
Tullock, Gordon. The logic of the law. Basic Books, 1987.
28
Ritter, Emily Hencken, and Courtenay R. Conrad. "Preventing and responding to dissent: The observational
challenges of explaining strategic repression." American Political Science Review 110, no. 1 (2016): 85-99.
29
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge
University Press, 2005.
30
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
26
27
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the opposition into the political system, thereby altering the status quo. 31 Cooptation can legitimize
the government and guarantee the support of interest groups, particularly the elite, as well as the
population. 32
In accounting for the variation in the effectiveness of repression in leading to stability, Hafez as
well as Mason and Krane have argued that repression is effective in reducing protest when it is
used selectively and pre-emptively. 33 Furthermore, Khawaja has found that the use of repression
indiscriminately can challenge its effectiveness. 34 According to Wintrobe, states repress when
cooptation doesn’t suffice or if the state doesn’t have the sufficient capacity to coopt. 35 The
government can also implement negotiations with the opposition, grant pardons, reshuffle
administrative personnel, release prisoners and so on. However, while these strategies can help the
regime seek legitimation and contain the threat, these strategies are considered costly since they
tax the state’s time and resources. 36 Moreover, concessions in the form of accommodation can be
viewed as a sign of weakness, thereby leading to escalation and more radical demands, as variously
seen the Arab uprisings. 37

Gamson, William A. The strategy of social protest. 1975; Rasler, Karen. "Concessions, repression, and political
protest in the Iranian revolution." American Sociological Review (1996): 132-152.
32
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Unlike concessions, repression, however, is cheap and can impose a cost on the target while
deterring specific activities. Repression can potentially raise the costs for political protest and deter
would-be challengers and their supporters. 38 While repression can be a complement to
accommodations, Della Porta and Ritter see repression as an alternative to accommodations. 39
Since repression can preclude the government from the need to offer accommodations, it can be
regarded as the more appealing strategy, since it offers the same benefits as others in providing
stability, but at a lower cost. 40
However, repression has several constraints and drawbacks which often makes it a last resort. It
can make the regime lose legitimacy, which decreases the likelihood of its long-term survival. In
examining the impact of repression on legitimacy, the distinction between high and low-intensity
forms is useful. While high-intensity repression reduces legitimacy through creating popular
resentment, the impact of low-intensity repression is milder. Thus, the higher the level of
repression, the greater the cost for legitimacy. This can be observed in the Egyptian and Tunisian
revolutions, where repression led to further decline in the regime’s legitimacy as well as greater
divisions within the regime itself.
Furthermore, repression does not address the roots of contestation and popular grievances, which
potentially makes it only a short-term strategy rather than a long-term one. Social movements
scholarship has theorized on the potential escalation effect of repression through strengthening the
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opposition, which would render repression counter-productive. 41 In addition to escalation,
repression can also lead to the diffusion of challenges, tactical adaptation, among other alternatives
for mass mobilization.
From an economic perspective, repression is costly since it drains available resources through
expenditure on security and intelligence forces, weaponry, training and so on. These costs increase
when the population is large, and the threat level is high. It also reduces the society’s level of
prosperity through destruction of assets and human losses. 42 From an external perspective,
repression can lead to international isolation through sanctions, which can also be
counterproductive through destabilizing the regime. 43
Given these downsides, there is little empirical evidence that suggests that repression works,
especially in the long-term, in achieving regime stability. There is evidence that regimes, therefore,
use repression only when there is no alternative and when the benefits of repression outweigh its
costs. In linking different economic and political structures to these benefits and costs, the next
section reviews the literature on authoritarian resilience in the Arab region to examine the survival
strategies that have historically been used to stabilize Arab states.

1.3. Arab Exceptionalism and Authoritarian Strategies
Having reviewed theoretical approaches to authoritarianism, this section analyzes the theoretical
literature on authoritarianism within the Arab world to examine the region’s traditional survival
strategies. In the 20th century’s last quarter, trends in several world regions, referred to as the “third
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wave”, were signaling the decline of authoritarianism and the potential universalization of
democracy. However, despite limited liberalization in the Arab world in the 1990s,
authoritarianism remained robust as states reinvented their strategies of survival. 44 In examining
the persistence of authoritarianism in the region, a variety of explanations have been put forth to
account for the region’s authoritarian resilience. Several internal and external factors account for
authoritarianism in the Middle East, though there is little consensus regarding them.
Historically, some of the explanations for Arab authoritarianism focused on culture, arguing for
the incompatibility of Islam with democracy, as well as the weakness of civil society and
associational life. However, these explanations have come under critiques due to their orientalist
biases. For example, Anderson has argued that explaining Arab authoritarianism through political
culture frames the region in essentialist terms while dismissing resistance as an abnormality. 45
With the emergence of the second and third waves of autocracy research, as was examined in the
last section, the literature on the puzzle of "Arab exceptionalism" has focused on examining the
nature of political and economic governance within Arab states. Several paradigms have been
proposed to account for the mechanisms of authoritarian resilience in the region.
Building on Gerschewski, Scheitzer explains that, to maintain their stability, clientelist political
elites in the region have traditionally used the three pillars of stability: legitimation, cooptation,
and repression. 46 As part of the authoritarian bargain, the region’s regimes have historically
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institutionalized their rentier economies to provide the populations with their economic needs, in
exchange for their loyalty and complacency towards the regime’s lack of freedoms, accountability,
transparency and pluralist participation. However, for those segments of society that dissented,
repression has been continuously deployed to limit threats. 47 This section examines these
mechanisms, while the next chapters will account for how the distinction between monarchies and
republics can impact the choice of strategy. This lays the foundation for analyzing the uneven
levels of unrest and state responses within the Arab uprisings in the next chapters.
Cooptation
With the emergence of the third wave of autocracy research in the 1990s, several scholars have
emphasized the role of elections and political parties in sustaining Arab authoritarian states. Given
the neopatrimonial nature of Arab countries, states have traditionally used cooptation as a tool for
widening the state’s power base. Cooptation has been used to include economic as well as political
actors as the state has used formal and liberal institutions such as elections, parliaments, NGOs,
and others to sustain itself. 48 In theory, these measures were meant to legitimate the state through
the diffusion of power and gradual liberalization. In practice, they were used to quell opposition,
control voters and manage incumbent elites. 49
Cooptation limited the capacity of opposition movements to contest elections since the political
elite didn’t allow for political contestation to risk the safety of its power. If opposition groups were
to become threatening, they would be banned, disqualified or repressed. Hence, states didn’t allow
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for elections that were free and fair, which allowed for vote rigging and political manipulation50.
While cooptation has taken on various shapes in different states, its primary purpose was to
stabilize the ruler through intra-elite competition, which prevents any certain elite from becoming
threatening.
Repression
In addition to cooptation, the study of repression is central to understanding the authoritarian
resilience of regimes across the Arab world. In arguing against popular explanations of
exceptionalism, Bellin explains that, rather than cultural and socioeconomic explanations, the
Middle East’s authoritarian exceptionalism lies in the state’s unrestrained repressive capacity. 51
Examining repression, or the lack thereof, is, therefore, central to understanding how revolutions
unfold. Bellin argues that “democratic transition can be carried out successfully only when the
state’s coercive apparatus lacks the will or capacity to crush it. Where that coercive apparatus
remains intact and opposed to political reform, democratic transition will not occur.” 52 Both Bellin
and Brownlee cite Skocpol’s thesis that revolutions can’t succeed unless the security apparatus
loses its capacity and will to repress. 53
In examining the dynamics of coercive apparatus in the Middle East, Bellin traces the strength of
the coercive apparatuses to structural factors such as resource endowments, access to rent,
neopatrimonialism, and low institutionalization. Authoritarian countries in the region prioritize
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military expenditure to strengthen their security apparatus. The Homeland Security Research
Center explains that, even though China and the United States are the greatest absolute spenders
on their militaries, in terms of relative share to GDP, Middle East countries spend from 2 to 4 times
as much as the international superpowers. 54 Arab states, therefore, spend relatively more on their
security apparatuses than any other region.
This financial base provides them with the necessary capacity to repress. To guarantee the loyalty
of its elite and its members, the state must provide adequate financial support, financed through
rent revenues, for its security apparatus. With neopatrimonialism, low institutionalism as well as
limited pressure by external patrons, repression becomes a convenient tool for rulers to limit
potential challenges from opposition and civil society.
Legitimation
While cooptation and repression play distinctive functions in the inner logic of authoritarianism in
the Arab region, Hudson and Schlumberger argue that these factors alone cannot explain the
survival of authoritarian regimes since authoritarian stability requires legitimacy. 55 While
repression presents a useful strategy, it is seen as too costly to maintain stability in the long-run. 56
Repression, thus, can be used as a last resort when there is a threatening legitimacy deficit. 57
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Authoritarian states, therefore, need non-democratic sources of legitimacy. Schlumberger and
Albrecht distinguish between internal and external dimensions of legitimation. 58 While internal
legitimation refers to that of the local populace, external legitimation refers to the legitimacy
derived from regional and international powers, whether governments or international
organizations. In further disaggregating legitimation strategies, Schlumberger further identifies
four components of legitimacy that are used in the region: religion, tradition, ideology, and welfare
gains as main sources of such legitimacy. 59
One of the most widely used paradigms in explaining legitimation in the Arab world has been the
rentierism theory. In the 1960s and 1970s, in parallel with the second wave of authoritarianism
research, and influenced by Lipset, modernization theorists focused on the socioeconomic basis of
democratization, thereby emphasizing the relations between democracy and socioeconomic
underdevelopment, the lack of a market economy, low literacy levels, and a small middle class. 60
While economic explanations are still used by many scholars, the focus has often shifted away
from development to the source of revenues and the class structure.
Given the prevalence of neopatrimonial and clientlist states in the region, several scholars have
examined the role of rent as a tool that is particularly used by oil-rich monarchies to coopt citizens
and to maintain stability. According to Beblawi & Luciani, substantial rent has precluded states in
the region from taxing the population, while allowing them to distribute rents in exchange for
political loyalty. 61 Thus, access to large revenues, that is accrued not from production or taxes but
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from rents, makes a state autonomous from its society in terms of the source of income. While oil
represents the main source of rent revenue, other sources such as aid, remittances, pipeline
crossings, transit fees and others can also be used for the same function. However, more than
others, since oil- monarchies have access to substantial rent revenues, they can distribute them to
main target groups, thereby buying political loyalty and maintaining stability.
The theory of the rentier state draws on modernization theory, but it also addresses some of its
gaps. Hinnebusch suggested that the failure of contemporary high-income, oil-rich states in the
Middle East to democratize also shows the shortcomings of the modernization theory. In his view:
“Modernization thresholds have not been exceeded in so far as much of this income derives
from external rent that increases (and decreases) without much of the societal mobilization
or complexity which Modernization Theory believes make authoritarian governance
unviable” 62.
Critics of the theory however point to the fact that the theory is neglecting a range of relevant
factors, such as the impact of international oil price fluctuations and problems of relativedeprivation. 63 The uses and limitations of different forms of legitimation are explored further in
the next section.

1.4. Monarchical Exceptionalism, Dynasticism and Rentierism
The Arab world contains a wide range of regimes. Instead of examining the Arab region as
homogenously nondemocratic, recognizing the distinctions between different types of regimes can
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explain different patterns of behavior. This thesis focuses on the most pronounced regime type
distinction, which is that between monarchies and republics. Monarchies have been understudied
as a regime type and Arab monarchies have been largely ignored in the analyses of the Arab
uprisings. By contrasting regimes and monarchies and breaking down monarchies into linchpin
and dynastic ones, this thesis can contribute to a better understanding of how different institutions
impact patterns of stability.
Monarchies have consistently been characterized as exceptionally resilient relative to republics. 64
Since World War II, authoritarian monarchies have been on average more stable than authoritarian
republics. During the cold war, authoritarian republics were often more unstable than monarchies
due to geopolitical tensions. Several reasons account for monarchical resilience. In the Arab world,
there are more monarchies than any other region. Arab monarchies have been classified in a variety
of ways based on religious authority, state-building capacity, and natural-resource endowment.
Except for Oman, all Arab monarchies are governed by Sunni Muslim royal families. Except for
Bahrain and Oman, all populations of monarchies are also predominantly Sunni Muslim. While
UAE and Saudi Arabia are absolutist monarchies, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, and
Oman are constitutional monarchies. 65
In explaining uneven protests and state responses, the most useful typology is the one
distinguishing between dynastic and linchpin monarchies. More than a binary, dynasticism,
however, should be viewed as a spectrum. While Kuwait and Saudi Arabia serve as traditional
examples of dynastic royal families, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have
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emulated this model. Morocco, Jordan, and Oman exhibit a moderate degree of dynasticism
because of the limitations placed on incorporating ruling family into the cabinet. 66
Using this typology allows for analyzing the relationship between the two competing paradigms
for monarchical exceptionalism: rentierism and dynasticism. The rentierism theory has been a
hallmark of explanations for monarchical exceptionalism as well as the greater institutional
underdevelopment of Middle Eastern states. Several of the classical works in modernization theory
have made reference to how rent-seeking has produced social structures and political cultures that
are not conducive for democratization. 67 In his groundbreaking study, Michael Ross has used a
large-N, cross-regional analysis to provide statistical support for the oil cruse as an explanation for
authoritarianism in oil-rich states. 68 Ross identifies three mechanisms through which oil hinder
democracy. First, the rentier effect reduces taxes and increases public spending, which generates
authoritarian legitimacy. Second, the repression effect enables the construction of a powerful
security apparatus, which deters democratic forces from threatening the state. Third, the
modernization effect eliminates the democratic pressures that arise from the transition to industrial
and service-sector jobs.
Herb, however, has challenged Ross’s causal mechanisms underlying the claim that rentierism
harms democracy. 69 Through altering the operationalization of Ross’s variables, Herb produced
varying results and explains that Ross’s analysis was biased due to drawing cases mostly from
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poor states. Herb explains that the presumed negative consequences of the abundance of oil such
as authoritarianism and corruption characterize the non-oil rich neighbors as they do for the oilrich monarchies. This suggests the presence of omission bias. Using a counterfactual measure of
development, Herb emphasizes the importance of regional democracy as a determining feature.
Thus, the impact of rentierism on democracy has to take into account regional contexts. As rentier
states are concentrated in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, it is likely that other regional
variables can provide a better explanation.
In examining Middle Eastern monarchies, Herb explains that the variable of dynasticism offers
several mechanisms through which it influences the stabilization mechanisms of royal families.
Dynasticism reinforces mechanism of accountability of the ruler to the dynasty. Thus, if the king’s
governance threatens the family’s interests, the family will intervene and replace the king.
Furthermore, the dynasty functions as an information network which solidifies the family’s grip.
In Saudi Arabia, the family’s sheer size, their distribution within the state and the society, and their
pyramidic of clientelistic relations allows them to adjust their policies in a way that serves the
effectiveness of their governance. Herb examines the historical monarchies of Iraq, Afghanistan,
Egypt, Iran and Libya to argue that the lack of dynasticism prompted their collapse.
As explained in the introduction, limited work has examined the relationship between these two
paradigms. In both paradigms, stability is viewed as an outcome, but none examine the different
mechanisms through which this outcome is achieved. By applying Gerschwski’s framework to
Herb’s regime typology, this thesis addresses some gaps in this theoretical debate while
providing a more nuanced account for how these different institutional features influence the
different strategies autocrats use.
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1.5. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the different literatures that will be used in the thesis. The first section
has introduced and historicized the theoretical approaches to authoritarian stability, outlining the
different research waves in the study of autocracy and how each has contributed to the
contemporary debates on the persistence of authoritarianism. This thesis draws most substantially
on research from the third wave, but it also relies on insights from the second wave. The second
section has examined the incentives and constraints states face in employing different authoritarian
strategies. This will be used in the case comparison when examining why states adopt different
strategies and why some are more effective than others. This will especially be revisited in the
thesis’s conclusion as the thesis’s findings are placed within their theoretical framework. The third
section has reviewed the literature on Arab exceptionalism, focusing on how different paradigms
approach the issue of authoritarian resilience in the region. Having reviewed how each strategy
has been employed in the region, the following chapters segment the analysis by regime type to
provide a more nuanced analysis. In the fourth section, this chapter has reviewed the literature on
the resilience of Arab monarchies and explored Herb’s typology. While monarchical resilience has
been attributed to factors such as culture, and and geostrategic relations, the role of rentierism and
dynasticism have primarily dominated the theoretical debates on monarchical exceptionalism. The
next chapters will further explore these theories and break down these factors while examining
historical survival strategies employed in Arab monarchies.
The next three chapters comparatively analyze the historical survival strategies of Arab regimes
and the wave of protests and state responses during the Arab uprisings. The Arab uprisings
represented a shock to countries across the region. In examining the causes and impacts of the
Arab uprisings, along with accounting for popular grievances and opportunity structures, it is
32

necessary to examine how the states’ survival strategies within the countries that witnessed unrest
either broke down or, alternatively, managed to withstand the shock. The chapters are themed by
case study. The chapter on Saudi Arabia represents a case of a dynastic monarchy, Morocco a case
of linchpin monarchy, and Egypt a case of republic. Each begins by analyzing the state’s historical
survival strategies and how they were influenced by state institutions. This is followed by
examining the nature and level of protests during the uprisings and then how and why incumbent
elites used which survival strategy during the uprisings, while analyzing the effectiveness of each
strategy in confronting unrest. Each chapter ends with a conclusion synthesizing the findings and
contextualizing them within the broader regime category. This is revisited in the thesis’s
conclusion as the thesis assesses the prospects of stability in these cases in the developments
following the uprisings.

33

34

Chapter 2. Saudi Arabia
2.1. Historical Survival Strategies
Legitimation
Monarchies have an advantage over republics in the degree and form of legitimacy, which provides
them with more resilience using traditional, economic as well as religious forms of legitimacy.
Across monarchies, despite occasional contestation to individual rulers and the extent of power
they exercise, most citizens continue to support the monarchy as a political system. 70 Except for
Bahrain, Arab kings enjoy a relatively high degree of legitimacy. The Amman-based Royal Islamic
Strategic Studies Centre, an independent research organization that gauges the influence of the
world’s Muslim leaders, ranks the Saudi, Moroccan, and Jordanian kings first, second, and fourth,
respectively, on its list “The Muslim 500: The World’s Most Influential Muslims. Moreover, in
2007, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project found Saudi
Arabia’s King Abdullah to be the most popular leader in Muslim countries. 71 This has solidified
Saudi Arabia’s status as one of the world’s last remaining absolute monarchies.
In accounting for such high levels of legitimacy, dynasticism and the resulting control by the royal
family of state institutions plays a central role in shaping the dynamics of the ruling coalition .
Historically, the state structure of Saudi Arabia has been intimately tied to the Al Saud family
given the family’s role in state formation. Although the exact size of the royal family is unknown
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and is sometimes considered a state secret, it has been estimated between 5,000 and 8,000 adults. 72
The royal family is marked by a complex structure with varying levels of connection to Saudi
society. Even though Herb has highlighted how the family serves as a tool for internal cohesion,
intra-familial competition still takes place. While seniority has traditionally served as the key
requirement for succession, other factors such as the social standing of the mothers have
occasionally influenced the choice of successor. Moreover, family members in power also often
play a role in appointing the heir apparent, which can pose a potential for succession dilemmas.
This has occasionally led to conflicts within the family, as demonstrated by the purge in 2017 by
crown prince Mohammed bin Salman of major political and economic figures. This will be
examined further in the chapter’s conclusion.
In addition to dynasticism’s role in state formation, the king’s legitimacy in Saudi Arabia has been
derived from religious, economic as well as external dimensions. In his religious legitimacy, the
Saudi king’s absolute power is restrained only by the Quran and the sharia, whose constitutional
status is guarded by the Wahhabi clerics. The Saudi state is fused around a single cultural and
religious identity based on the royal family’s cooptation of the ultraconservative Wahhabi base,
whose interpretation of Islam exerts substantial influence over state and society.
Moreover, in examining the legitimacy of monarchies in the Arab world, several of the paradigms
explored in explanations for authoritarianism in the Arab world have been applied to this regime
type. The rentier theory has been the one most often used to account for monarchical stability in
the region. More than half of the government’s revenues in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar come from the sale of oil. 73 Saudi Arabia represents a classic
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rentier state. With proven oil reserves at one-quarter of the world’s total, Saudi Arabia’s with oil
revenues have historically marked approximately 90–95 percent of its total export earnings and
35–40 percent of its GDP. 74
By international standards, the citizens of GCC countries are one of the wealthiest as reflected by
their per capita gross domestic product. 75 More than high incomes, citizens in the GCC pay no
income tax, and many receive subsidized housing, healthcare, and education. Furthermore, except
for Saudi Arabia, GCC monarchies have relatively small populations. Additionally, in GCC
monarchies, only a minority of the population are citizens, with foreign labor accounting for the
majority of the population. However, rather than the size of wealth, it is the source of the wealth
which influences the structure of authoritarianism. The abundance of oil and natural gases,
combined with a small population, has enabled rulers not only to build up key state institutions
like the security apparatus but also to become enormously wealthy themselves and to transfer some
of the riches to their citizens. This long-term affluence of citizens has, therefore, effectively stifled
formal political opposition in the GCC countries. 76 Oil wealth, through generating non-tax
revenue, provides an opportunity for authoritarian regimes to stave off popular mobilization. In
addition to reducing social protests, oil wealth, therefore, leads to more stability. 77
Thus, across the GCC, neoliberal economic policies have not made middle-class citizens as
downwardly mobile as they were in states such as Egypt, Tunisia, or Morocco. The economic
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safety net from petroleum wealth has kept the floor from falling out under Gulf citizens. This
classic rentier trade-off of economic wellbeing in return for political quiescence still seems to hold
in the Gulf. Economic stimulus and the securitization of sectarian identities brought Gulf regimes
some political breathing space.
Moreover, for external legitimation, Geddes has argued that monarchies are more insulated from
great power politics than republics as they are less vulnerable to geopolitical tensions and are,
therefore, more stable. 78 Arab oil-monarchies, in specific, have historically enjoyed limited
pressures from international powers to democratize as resulting instability can lead to higher oil
prices, which could threaten economic performances across regions. Thus, the geostrategic nature
of oil-rich monarchies within global politics has allowed them to enjoy limited pressures for
liberalization. 79 While this applies to monarchies like Saudi Arabia, it doesn’t, however, apply to
Morocco.
Cooptation
While the rentierism approach has been the “hegemonic theoretic framework” in explaining
patterns of monarchical exceptionalism, Herb has analyzed the set-up of monarchical regimes to
explain how they achieve stability through cooptation. 80 By contrast to leaders of republics, most
monarchs have operated at some institutional and symbolic distance from the political arena, and
thus had a crucial advantage in managing elites. In his groundbreaking volume, “All in the
Family”, Michael Herb uses intra-regime dynamics to argue that the conditions for monarchical
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durability can be best understood when the peculiarities of royal family politics are considered,
particularly regarding the inclusion and exclusion of parts of the family in key decision-making
institutions. 81 Rather than attributing resilience to variables outside of the monarchy such as
geopolitical and cultural factors, Herb situates his analysis in the structural institutions of the
monarchy, which, through mechanisms of internal conflict regulation, allow for stability.
Herb critiques the traditional paradigms that explain monarchical resilience, specifically those
attributing it to oil revenues, external support and culture. According to him, while oil plays a role
in expanding the state apparatus, it is only an "intervening variable”. This can be demonstrated in
Libya, where rentier wealth didn’t allow for stability. Instead, Herb focuses on dynasticism as a
mechanism of cooptation, explaining it as the main reason for the survival of monarchical regimes.
From the perspective of institutions, authoritarian leaders rely on the support of a base coalition
for their power. This coalition must be kept cohesive and loyal. This is commonly achieved
through the distribution of private goods. However, since the coalition can’t guarantee that the
stream of benefits will remain constant, a commitment problem can arise, especially during times
of economic stagnation. 82 In dynastic monarchies, however, more than reflecting a hereditary
system, dynasticism involves intrafamily cohesion that makes the ruling coalition intricately
dependent on the regime’s survival and is, thus, more likely to remain cohesive. This reflects the
way in which dynastic Arab monarchies have developed ways of including family as well as core
elite members in political decision-making.
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In such states, the state-building era provided an opportunity for the ruling family to establish its
predominance while extending its control over state institutions. Herb explains that, in contrast to
linchpin monarchies, which are more personalist, in dynastic monarchies, "members of the ruling
families monopolize the highest state offices … (and) distribute members throughout lower
positions in the state apparatus, especially in the key ministries”. 83 With family members
distributed throughout major governmental bureaucracies, the threats from rivals is minimized.
Herb uses the case of Iran’s Pahlavi dynasty to demonstrate how, despite being rich in oil, the lack
of a dynastic monarchy led to collapse. Under the Iranian monarchy, the shah failed to build a
single-party monarchy and used increasing repression to stabilize the state. The Shah’s relatives
were excluded from senior positions within the state as the shah chose not to delegate power. This
made the state increasingly vulnerable, which culminated in his overthrow by the 1979 revolution.
While no Arab dynastic monarchy has been overthrown, linchpin monarchies such as those
historically in Libya and Afghanistan, despite the presence of large rent revenues, the failure of
establishing dynastic control led to their overthrow.
Repression
Oil-rich, dynastic monarchies enjoy relatively high expenditure on their military and have
sophisticated security forces. However, despite this greater capacity, Smith explains that, while oil
leads to more stability, its effect is through strategies other than repression. 84 According to Josua
and Edel, the higher and better legitimacy monarchies has precluded them from the use of
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repression. 85 This suggests that, unlike in republics, monarchies have channeled dissent through a
system that reduces the necessity for repression.
Moreover, since states are more likely to repress when they are consolidating their power,
monarchies are less likely to repress given their durability. According to Anderson, et al., states
repress to signal to political rivals the regime’s capacity and propensity of using repression. 86 This
suggests that, over time, repression should decrease, all else equal. This, however, applies more to
high-intensity forms of repression than to low-intensity ones. Overall, when monarchies use
repression, they use it pre-emptively and more moderately. Husayn argues that monarchies may
use high repression only when there are power struggles within the family. 87 However, the use of
repression across Arab monarchies has historically been low and more targeted when compared to
republics. This applies to dynastic as well as linchpin monarchies.
In Saudi Arabia, despite the low level of high-intensity repression, there has been a high level of
low-intensity repression. 88 Saudi Arabia, like other dynastic monarchies, has historically limited
the role of the opposition while stifling the development of political activism through banning,
stifling, coopting, and manipulating oppositional groups and organizations. In the six GCC states,
only Bahrain and Kuwait have anything resembling an organized opposition. However, even in
these states, the opposition’s capacity for contestation remains minimal. For example, while
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Kuwait has had an active parliament and can hold the government accountable, the emir’s ability
to dissolve parliament prevents the likelihood of political reform. 89
In Saudi Arabia, the strong state control of institutions has made it one of the most tightly
controlled countries. However, the Saudi state has often sought to coopt rather than forcefully
confront the opposition. 90 Nonetheless, given the predominance of the Wahhabi Influence in Saudi
Arabia, the state has frequently had to resort to targeted repression and sectarian incitement to
control the Eastern province. 91 The Eastern province is Saudi Arabia’s largest province and has
most of the country’s oil reserves. However, it also has the highest concentration of Saudi Shias.92
The Shia minority, which numbers between 2.8 million to 4.2 million and is approximately 10 to
15 percent of the general population, but is 33 percent in the Eastern Province, has historically
suffered from religious discrimination, economic deprivation and exclusion from the political
process. Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi influence has led to the institutionalized marginalization of the
large Shia Muslim minority. Naturally, for the persecuted or harassed Shia communities in
Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, the religious authority of Sunni royal families and ruling elites
has stirred resentment and fueled their opposition. 93
While the minority has often concealed its faith to avoid discrimination, several historical phases
have witnessed the heightening of the minority’s dissent. 94 For example, with the 1979 Iranian
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revolution, Saudi Shia demonstrated in demand for an end to discrimination as well as political
and economic rights. This, however, led to the state responding with harsh repression, which led
to the exile of the opposition’s leaders. 95 Subsequently, despite some gesture of reconciliation and
promises of increased religious freedom and political opportunities, the pattern of dissent followed
by crackdown has persisted. Consequently, the Sunni-Shia divide is an important factor preventing
the coalescing of the opposition.

2.2.

Survival Strategies During the Protests

Unlike in republics, in monarchies, protester’s demands were limited and non-confrontational and
protesters demanded reform, not revolution and regime change. Thus, protests did not call into
question the monarchs’ basic political and economic arrangements. Instead, they sought political
and socioeconomic changes such as electoral reform, freedom to establish civil society
organizations, and guarantees of freedom of expression. In some cases, there were demands for
changes in personnel, particularly through the removal of corrupt and incompetent ministers. 96
In dynastic monarchies, social cleavages played a leading role in precipitating unrest, with Shia
identity in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and stateless Bidoon people in Kuwait. In Saudi Arabia, the
Shia minority in the Eastern Province was the actor to instigate the wave of wave of protests.
However, as examined earlier, waves of dissent in the Eastern Province long predate the events of
2011. In 2011, inspired by the transnational flow of ideas across Arab countries, especially through
the close ties with the Bahraini Shia, protests began on February 17, 2011 in the Eastern
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Province. 97 Despite the permanent national ban on protests in the oil-rich Eastern Province, in the
Shia-majority governorate of Qatif, demonstrators demanded an end to religious discrimination,
the release of political prisoners, the expansion of women’s rights, and a lifting of the restrictions
on freedom of speech. This resulted in the spreading of protests to several cities in the Eastern
province as well as in calls for a “day of rage” on the 11th of March 2011 in the capital of Riyadh. 98
The “day of rage”, however, failed to materialize as the state’s preemptive deployment of security
forces and heavy-handed police blockades prevented any escalation of protests. Thus, the Saudi
capital has witnessed only minor protests while most protests have instead taken place in the
Eastern Province. While the state succeeded in controlling and deterring protests in 2011, a second
of wave began when notable protests reemerged in the summer of 2012. This involved renewed
marches to demand the release of imprisoned civil rights activists in locations as disparate as
Riyadh, al-Qatif, al-Qasim and the pilgrimage center of Mecca. Protests around al-Qatif especially
surged following the arrest of prominent Shaikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr. More than a sectarian riot,
the Shia minority protested to call for its socioeconomic demands, such as the reduction of
unemployment, particularly youth unemployment. Overall, while frequent, protests in Saudi
Arabia failed to gain momentum and become widespread, this wave of Shia dissent was
historically unique in its use of street protests as the primary mode of resistance. 99
Legitimation
Along with other dynastic monarchies, Saudi Arabia has mainly relied on rent redistribution to
legitimate itself in the wake of the protests. In all GCC monarchies, economic stimulus packages
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were used to pre-empt and quell the protests. 100 Thus, oil-monarchies such as Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, moved quickly to increase public spending
to avoid any potential grievances. In Saudi Arabia, during February and March of 2011, the king
took preemptive action in the form of an extensive economic package. This included increasing
public spending, financial gifts in the form government benefits to its citizens. 101 The king also
promised to spend $37 billion on raising civil service salaries and subsidies and building lowincome housing units even before protests broke out in its troubled Eastern Province. Furthermore,
following the demonstrations, the king earmarked an additional $93 billion for various
socioeconomic projects, including the creation of sixty thousand government jobs. Not counting
its financial commitments to other Arab monarchs, the Saudi government pledged $130 billion to
buy social peace. It also pledged $400 billion to improve education, health care and infrastructure
by the end of 2014 102. These handouts, however, were focused on the Sunni population, thereby
continuing the policies of exclusion towards the Shia minority. 103
Cooptation
Unlike in republics and linchpin monarchies, dynastic monarchies have historically had little
organized, formal political opposition for the state to coopt, as examined earlier. With a weak and
stifled civil society, the royal family has often spread its influence over state institutions, as Herb
has analyzed. Nonetheless, with the challenges of the Arab uprisings, dynastic monarchies have
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sought to coopt threatening actors through some minor political reforms. These reforms served as
safety valves for dissent and were also used to shore up the state’s popular support. Thus, as in
Saudi Arabia, cooptation efforts were granted in the form of political concessions that provide for
a limited degree of political liberalization and loosening of the kingdom’s strict laws. 104
In May 2011, the Saudi government announced that the municipal council elections, planned to be
held in 2009, would finally be held. 105 Furthermore, King Abdullah announced that, starting in
2015, women will be allowed to participate in municipal elections and will be eligible for
appointments to the Shura Council, an advisory body to the king. He also overturned the sentence
of ten lashes of a woman who participated in the women’s right-to- drive campaign in Jeddah.
Nonetheless, providing reforms for the Eastern Province proved difficult. With the outbreak of
protests in the Eastern province, the state reacted promptly and released several prisoners to
prevent further demonstrations. The state was successful in pressuring some Shia clerics and
traditional opposition activists to channel demands into less contentious forms such as petitions
and dialogue with the regime. However, it failed to pacify the younger generation of activists,
signaling the growing gap between the traditional Shia leaders and the youth movements.
However, in containing the threat from the Shia minority, the state used a strategy of
sectarianization to marginalize the demands of the Shia and to fragment the opposition. As
examined earlier, the demands of the protests in the Eastern province featured more than sectarian
calls. However, the state has framed the protesters as sectarian to dismiss them. The state used
anti-Shia discourse to promote sectarian tensions while diverting attention away from
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socioeconomic and political demands. Thus, media campaigns were orchestrated that promoted
narratives of national and religious unity while portraying the protesters as external agents. This
succeeded in thwarting attempts to spread protests more widely and in furthering the exclusion of
the Shia minority. 106
In examining how Saudi Arabia, along with other dynastic monarchies, weathers political crises,
Herb’s analysis is useful. Herb explains that dynastic monarchies can provide elite guarantees
since they can’t be voted out of office. In dynastic monarchies, the frequently wide presence of
royal families in society provided a built-in intelligence service, keeping the families close to those
they ruled. Furthermore, Herb argues that family control over state institutions helps smooth over
potentially difficult questions of succession and guarantees loyalty and the ruler’s accountable to
the dynasty. This promotes cohesion of the family and unity among the ruling elite. This, however,
doesn’t apply to non and semi-dynastic monarchies. 107
Given this framework, despite some modest measures, cooptation was not the major strategy used
by the state in limiting protests when compared to the more drastic reforms in linchpin monarchies.
Unlike in linchpin monarchies, in dynastic monarchies, firing the cabinet means firing one’s
relatives, and giving the legislature more power effectively means giving one’s extended family
less power. This is one of the underlying political constraints of the dynastic monarchies and, thus,
one of the reasons that the popular support they receive comes more from their religious authority
and ability to provide prosperity rather than political reforms and expanded representation.
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Nonetheless, the royal family’s penetration of state institutions has guaranteed internal cohesion
and the prevention of elite fragmentation.
Repression
While the dynastic, oil monarchies have historically relied on carrots for the most part, they have
also employed sticks when threatened. In Saudi Arabia, repression increased steadily after the
initial wave of protests in February/March 2011 had subsided. The already limited rights for
freedom of expression and assembly were narrowed, media laws were tightened, and, more
generally, the levels of political repression were raised. However, high-level repression was
deployed in a relatively targeted and discriminate fashion. While high-level repression was
deployed against large-scale protests in the Eastern Province, outbreaks of popular protest
elsewhere in Saudi Arabia was pre-empted by low to moderate repression.
Moreover, the level of repression within the Eastern province was also discriminate based on the
level of threat of the actor. Thus, opposition leaders were subjected to brutal repression, while
rank-and-file protesters were met with low-intensity levels of repression. While it was claimed by
the state that there are no political prisoners, there was a detainee out of every six hundred Saudis
who was hold without trial in inhumane conditions and there were approximately 30,000 prisoners
of opinion. 108 Using Josua’s typology, it can be argued that, whereas the repression targeted against
the high-level activists in the Eastern province was incapacitating, that targeted at the broader
population was only constraining. 109
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In al-Qatif, hundreds of demonstrators were arrested that spring, which led to the suspension of
protests. When protests re-emerged in the Summer of 2012, the level of repression was heightened
with the police shooting into the crowds with live ammunition, resulting in the death of dozens of
protesters. This succeeded in limiting and deterring collective action as prominent Shia figures and
community leaders ordered an end to all protests. 110
In examining the increasing use of repression, the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data
Project offers useful findings. 111 The index divides human rights into a “Physical Integrity Rights
Index”, which measures high-intensity forms of repression such as political imprisonment and
torture, and an “Empowerment Rights Index”, which measures low-intensity forms of repression
such as political participation and freedom of speech and religion. Historically, gulf monarchies
have had low scores in the empowerment rights index. Saudi Arabia has had the lowest possible
score in all sub-indices of the empowerment index. However, the physical integrity rights index
has been relatively higher when compared to Arab republics. With the uprisings, Bahrain had the
highest global decline in respect for physical integrity rights. Saudi Arabia also witnessed
considerable and sustained declines in physical integrity rights. This reflects how, despite low
levels of harsh repression historically, dynastic, oil-rich monarchies can potentially become highly
repressive when confronted with threats.

2.3.

Conclusion & Post-Uprisings Development

Even though the GCC as a whole has not been confronted with protests, the Arab uprisings have,
nonetheless, led states, even if those that had no demonstrations, to employ stabilization strategies
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to pre-empt any potential challenges and has prompted regional cooperation between monarchies
to guarantee regional stability. 112 With the exception of Bahrain, in monarchies across the GCC,
there have been considerable similarities within state responses, which reflects how common
power configurations and state institutions have resulted in similar survival strategies. The most
common reaction in the kingdoms was to economically legitimize the royal family by buying
social peace through cash bonuses, lowered food prices, job creation and subsidized housing. Some
dynastic monarchs also accommodated popular demands through offering political concessions,
though these concessions have been relatively modest when compared with those of other states
in the region. Thus, when confronted with unrest, where other states legitimate themselves through
reform, dynastic monarchies have legitimated themselves through rent distribution. Moreover,
despite pledges of holding council elections, the state in dynastic monarchies has been constrained
in its capacity to coopt, especially with ethnic minorities, due to the royal family’s traditional
control of state institutions. Finally, as demonstrated in the case of Bahrain, foreign assistance was
an additional important component of countering the challenges signified by the Arab uprisings.
In Saudi Arabia, rather than surviving through the support of a particular group, internal cohesion
played the leading role in guaranteeing loyalty and preventing elite splits, which reflects Herb’s
analysis of intra-regime dynamics. Unlike the linchpin monarchies, dynastic monarchies, given
their prosperity and cohesion, do not need to establish a reformist reputation. Thus, Saudi Arabia
has maintained the initiative in promoting economic stimulus more than political reforms.
However, in dealing with the Shia minority, one notable change that has taken place when
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compared to earlier waves of dissent has been the increased use of, targeted repression as well as
a rise in the securitization of sectarian identities.
This also applies to the larger Gulf region. In examining the impact of the Arab uprisings on Gulf
monarchies, Kamrava explains that, “the most notable change in the ruling bargain in the Gulf has
been the increased use of repression by state authorities against oppositional groups and
individuals”. 113 Moreover, the Arab uprisings have led to a form of solidary among monarchies as
reflected by the GCC’s intervention in Bahrain and its invitation to Jordan and Morocco to join
the GCC as members. Thus, despite its limited penetration in this category, the Arab uprisings
have still contributed to shifts in the historical survival strategies employed by its states, which
amounts to an evolution in dynamics of stabilization for dynastic monarchies.
This shift is further illustrated through examining how economic pressures following the protests
of 2011-2012 have reconfigured Saudi Arabia’s authoritarian strategies. One of the most
prominent global changes after 2011 has been the oil glut, in which an oversupply coupled with a
decline in demand have resulted in sharp declines in the price of oil. Thus, the price of oil has
plummeted from approximately US$110 per barrel in 2011 and 2012 to approximately $50 in
2017. 114 This has had adverse implications on oil-rich monarchies. In Saudi Arabia, when the surge
in oil prices that was in place when the 2011 protests emerged experienced a hit in 2014 with
declining oil revenues, the state has had to rely on borrowing to finance its expenditure. With
growing deficits and rising youth unemployment, the state has come under pressure in maintaining
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its unsustainable levels of welfare. However, more than economic pressure, the decline in oil
revenues for Saudi Arabia may risk its powerful geopolitical role in the region. 115
Despite this economic pressure, the Arab uprisings have led to an increasingly active and assertive
regional role for Saudi Arabia, reflected in its efforts of countering the influence of Iran, the
Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafi jihadism as embodied by al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. This
foreign policy is embedded within its insecurity as the Saudi state attempts to shield Saudi society
from these regional trends, whether secular or religious. Wehrey explains that the Saudi state has
been anxious from the challenges that arise, “not from ‘hard-power’ foes, but instead take the form
of “soft-power” ideological challenges”. 116
Meanwhile, with the death of king Abdallah in 2015, crown prince Salman was appointed as the
new king by the royal regime’s Allegiance Council. The 79-year-old king has made his young son,
Mohammad bin Salman, the crown prince, making him the “power behind the throne”. 117
Mohammad bin Salman, who has been the subject of international media attention, has sought to
consolidate his power while pushing for a progressive and reformist agenda. He has been credited
with loosening the strict social regulations, arresting hardline clerics, stripping religious police
from the right to arrest, as well as pushing for reforms to improve women’s and minority rights.
More ambitiously, he drew up the project of Vision 2030 which, among other goals, aims to reduce
Saudi Arabia’s historical reliance on oil through economic diversification. 118
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More than a legitimation measure, these reforms have allowed the crown prince to expand his
powers. Historically, a delicate balance was maintained among members of the royal family
through allocating positions across the family’s different branches. However, bin Salman has
monopolized the control of positions as he purged potential rivals. 119 This is demonstrated in his
anti-corruption crackdown in November 2017 in which ministers, princes, businessmen became
confined as their assets were frozen. While the motive of this purge is still disputed, it has allowed
the state to gain financial assets estimated at $800 billion while sidelining bin Salman’s rivals. 120
This shake-up doesn’t challenge Herb’s analysis, however, on the durability of intra-regime
dynamics in dynastic monarchies as bin Salman’s move constitutes a reorganization rather than a
restructuring of state institutions, which, therefore, maintains internal cohesion.
Nonetheless, despite the strong public-relations campaign portraying the increasing reforms being
undertaken by bin Salman, the increasing trend in repression, even though less covered, has
continued as hundreds of prominent writers, academics, poets, journalists and human-rights
defenders have been arrested and organizations such as the Saudi Civil and Political Rights
Association have been targeted. 121 Moreover, in recent years, several incidents have led to renewed
tensions with the Shia minority, most notable of which was in 2016 when the state carried out its
largest mass execution since 1980 as it executed 47 imprisoned civilians that were convicted of
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terrorism. 122 This sparked protests in Iran and Iraq and led to a renewed wave of sporadic dissent
in the Qatif region of the Eastern province. 123
In sum, after the 2011-12 protests, political developments in Saudi Arabia have led to a shift and
a reconfiguration in the state’s traditional authoritarian strategies. This is reflected in how the Saudi
state is increasingly resorting to measures of legitimation through reforms as economic pressures
caused by low oil prices have resulted in austerity measures, which led to limitations in the state’s
historical pattern of rent redistribution. Thus, tax hikes and subsidy cuts were implemented, which
led to negative responses as Saudi citizens voiced their frustration. While the state may ease on
austerity when faced with popular grievances, 124 unless it can continuously stimulate its economy
or, alternatively, manage to diversify its economy away from oil, its capacity to generously buy
social peace as it did previously is unlikely. This suggests that the survival strategies of the dynastic
monarchy of Saudi Arabia has converged to those of the linchpin monarchies as both rely primarily
on legitimation through reforms to maintain stability. These developments reaffirm that the
strategy of rent redistribution can only be maintained through a constant supply of resources. As
resources are depleted, the autocrat faces the risks of defection and dissent. The state, therefore,
adapts itself and relies more on other strategies to compensate for this decline. Overall, while the
dynastic monarchy of Saudi Arabia remains the most stable of regime types, with the decline in
oil prices, the challenges from regional actors, and the internal pressures, it has signaled steps
towards restructuring its authoritarian strategies so that it can weather new domestic and regional
challenges.
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Chapter 3. Morocco
3.1.

Historical Survival Strategies

Legitimation
Linchpin monarchies, as dynastic ones, enjoy a relatively high level of legitimacy. An independent
2009 Moroccan poll found that over 90 percent of the respondents approved of the rule of King
Mohammed VI. 125 This legitimacy, in addition to playing a key role in accounting for the uneven
levels of mobilization between monarchies and republics, has also proved central in influencing
different state responses. In Morocco, as in Jordan, the recognition of the kings as direct
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad is a major component of their religious authority. King
Mohammed of Morocco is Amir al-Mu’minin, or Commander of the Faithful, a title that goes back
to the early days of Islam. Even though there is no mention of sharia law in the relatively liberal
Moroccan constitution, many Moroccans, especially the uneducated and the illiterate believe that
the blessings of God come down through the king. 126
Unlike Saudi Arabia, however, Morocco does not enjoy the same levels of dynasticism. In
Morocco, similar to Saudi Arabi, the heritage and national identity of the state are linked to the
Alawite family. However, with limited diffusion of royal power through the state apparatus, the
political leadership has rested with the king as the ultimate arbiter within the regime. The king,
therefore, assumes the practical power of various governmental offices. Since the monarch
himself, rather the family, maintains the balance between such key institutions as the army and the
parliament. This provides the king with great authority, but also poses considerable risk his
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survival. Thus, historically, king Hassan has had to deal with repeated coup and assassination
attempts for him to remain in power 127.
In addition to traditional, religious legitimacy, Morocco also enjoys external legitimacy. Although
it does not hold the level of external support as dynastic monarchies, Morocco enjoys support from
the United States and France, as it has positioned itself as a stable ally in North Africa 128. However,
unlike in dynastic, oil-rich monarchies, Morocco has struggled with maintaining its economic
legitimacy. In both linchpin monarchies, the economy is highly dependent on volatile revenue
sources such as money transfers from expatriates, foreign investment, tourism, and aid. Living
standards in these two countries are modest, with per capita incomes in 2017 of only $12,500 in
Jordan (123rd) and $8,600 in Morocco (147th). 129 In Morocco, King Hassan II has historically
sought to promote the growth of an urban middle class to broaden his political base, but in this
way neglected the social needs of the rural poor. This is led by widespread poverty is widespread
in rural areas. With liberalization, crony capitalism has led to rising frustration. Thus, similar to
republics, linchpin monarchies have been incapable of legitimating them through welfare
provisions 130.
Unlike oil-rich monarchies, but like republics, Morocco has adopted neoliberal measures which
has led to the dismantlement of the old developmentalist social contract. To economically
legitimate himself within this context, King Mohammed VI has taken the initiative to reinvent
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social policy while adopting neoliberal measures. Thus, the king has launched ambitious projects
such as the National Initiative for Human Development with the goals of addressing the limits of
structural adjustment through poverty reduction. These initiatives, however, similar to the Social
Fund for Development in Egypt, led to a marketization of development which shifted the
responsibility from the state to the society, as people were encouraged to make use of opportunities
within the free market. 131 Thus, while the Moroccan state enjoys traditional, religious and external
legitimacy, it has limited economic legitimacy.
Cooptation
Unlike dynastic monarchies, linchpin monarchies can be pressured to liberalize due to the lack of
power-sharing mechanisms that can allow for monarchical institutions to adapt without broadening
the power base. Historically, in both linchpin monarchies, power has rested in the palace, with the
king controlling the rules of the political game and the distribution of resources. This has allowed
the monarch to rule through arbitrating over competing elites. 132
In Morocco, despite losing control during French rule, the Alawite dynasty has been ruling the
kingdom for centuries, making it one of the oldest royal families in the world and the longestserving in the Arab world. 133 After independence, despite no constitutional prohibitions on royals
holding governmental positions, and, even though several members from the Alawite clan have
historically occupied cabinet posts, there has been no monopoly by the king’s relatives over key
positions. With limits on the prime minister’s power, Moroccan politics has been characterized by
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the king standing above parties and positioning himself as a symbol of nationalist aspirations while
balancing between elites. 134
Unlike their dynastic counterparts, the linchpin monarchies of Jordan and Morocco guarantee
institutional flexibility for the king, which allows for the implementation of reforms that would
not be potentially feasible in dynastic monarchies. Even though the king in linchpin monarchies
maintains ultimate authority over major policies, the state allows for partial liberalization and a
greater measure of political pluralism. This has led to diverse political parties operating legally
and participating in parliament, which have often cooperated to form national pacts. This was
demonstrated in the Jordanian National Charter in 1990 and the Moroccan constitutional reforms
of 1972. 135 This has allowed monarchs to appear to grant concessions and reinforce their role as
supreme arbitrator. Thus, multiparty politics permits greater scope for the transmission of societal
interests to decision makers and, occasionally, for organized opposition to state policies. Unlike in
dynastic monarchies, this greater space for the opposition is used to counteract potential unrest.
Historically, the king has applied measures of economic cooptation through protectionist policies
which empowered the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) elite. However, similar to
republics, Morocco’s debt crisis in the 1980s has forced it to undergo structural adjustment as
proposed by the international financial institutions. With liberalization, a conflict emerged between
the Moroccan ISI-elites, mainly the textile manufacturers, and the new class of exporters, mainly
from the apparel sector. 136
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With the ascension to the throne of Mohammed VI, Morocco’s parliamentary system enjoyed
greater freedom. According to Herb, Morocco has enjoyed the most developed party system among
monarchies. 137 Opposition parties have occupied leading governmental positions. For example, in
1998, the social democratic Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) won parliamentary
elections, which signaled steps towards democratization through the alternation of power. Such
measures have made Morocco transition to become “partly free” according to Freedom House’s
“Freedom in the World” report. 138
Nonetheless, among Arab constitutional monarchies, in addition to a modest voter turnout, Herb
found government manipulation of election results to be the most series in Morocco. Thus, after
the USFP’s victory, the king soon after coopted the party, while having their leader become prime
minister in 2002. Similarly, in the years leading to the protests of 2011-12, the Islamist moderate
party, PJD, the Justice and Development Party, was rising in popularity, making it the strongest
political player. To counter its influence, the king created the PAM, Authenticity and Modernity
Party, which was an Islamist, but a “monarchical” party. The PAM, which was led by the king’s
advisor, aimed to delegitimize the PJD and the Istiqlal parties, thereby guaranteeing the king’s
control of the political sphere. In this coopted political arena, there’s a depoliticization process of
the public sphere. This leads to dissociating political parties from traditional forms of politics as
they limit their contention to social and economic affairs, while renouncing challenging and
questioning the political system. Similarly, this narrows the interests of civil society to issues such
as women’s rights, which allows for blaming civil society and the opposition for socioeconomic
shortcomings. Thus, despite having a strong parliament that enjoys powers such as the ability to
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remove confidence in a ministry, Moroccan politics continues to be dominating by king as even
parliamentary statutes are subject to the king’s approval.
Repression
Since independence until the late 1990s, King Hassan II's reign was marked by high repression.
Several factors have contributed to King Hassan’s abusive power. During the 1960s, the economy
was experiencing stagnation, which led to growing opposition, thereby alarming the king and
pushing him to use repression. Moreover, by the 1970s, the military has attempted to assassinate
the king twice, prompting him to reassert his power through increased repression. With his death
and the ascension to the throne of his son, king Mohamed VI, the level of repression has
considerably declined as the new king introduced considerable political reforms. 139 Thus, unlike
his father, king Mohamed VI has shifted the strategy of survival more towards a mix of
legitimation and cooptation, while keeping repression to a minimum. For example, the king has
allowed socioeconomic protests while allowing for party formation, so as to avoid any backlash.
Nonetheless, the king has still imprisoned and harassed journalists and intellectuals, raided
headquarters of human rights organizations and censored politically critical publications. Thus,
even though repression under king Mohamed VI has relatively declined, there remained occasional
clamp downs on opposition, especially when there is low legitimacy. 140

3.2.

Survival Strategies during the Protests

Starting from the 1990s, the Moroccan state has tolerated the presence of socioeconomic protests.
By the 2000s, these protests were rising with coalitions such as the campaign against the high cost

Dalmasso, E. (2012). Surfing the Democratic Tsunami in Morocco: A Political Society and the Reconfiguration of
a Sustainable Authoritarian Regime. Mediterranean Politics (17) 2, 217-232.
140
Boukhars, Anouar. "Political Violence in North Africa: The Perils of Incomplete Liberalization." (2011).
139

62

of living gaining momentum. 141 The frequency of protests in Morocco has led to cycles of protests
followed by reforms. In 2011, a new cycle began when a youth movement from different
ideological orientations, which became known as the February 20th Movement for Change,
organized on Facebook. The movement was composed of more than 40 parties and associations
and was successful in mobilizing sections of the population whose were excluded by the traditional
political actors. On that day, 150,000 to 200,000 Moroccans took to the streets in fifty-three towns
and cities across the country. Smaller, mostly uncoordinated demonstrations continued for months.
Thus, unlike the sporadic demonstrations in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman, the protests in
Morocco, as were in Jordan, were sustained.
The participants were mainly non-partisan young, educated, and urban middle-class men and
women. Berbers also participated in the protests demanding the end of ethnic discrimination. The
mostly coopted political parties, except for the fringe United Socialist Party and the banned
Islamist group, Justice and Charity (JC), did not participate and advised their youth organizations
to stay away. Moroccan protests were, therefore, devoid of political parties as well as traditional
civil society, which condemned the 20 February movement. In addition to socioeconomic
demands, the demands of the movement focused on full democratization while limiting the powers
of the king. While not calling for abolishing the monarchy or even deposing the king, the protesters
called for a “king who reigns but does not rule”. Unlike republics, in which the goal was
democratization from below, Morocco’s protests called for democratization from above as they
demanded that the king limit his own power. 142
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Legitimation
Morocco has used the political legitimation measures employed by republics as well as the
economic ones employed by dynastic monarchies. Even though Morocco didn’t adopt economic
stimulus packages as generous as those of dynastic monarchies, King Mohammed VI still made
several gestures to strategically important groups. For example, the king raised the minimum wage
and increased social security and retirement benefits for trade unions. He also met with
representatives of unemployed university graduates and promised to create four thousand jobs.
The king also raised civil servants’ salaries, increased subsidies for basic food and fuel and
expanded free health care, and obligatory medical insurance for all workers. 143
Politically, similar to republics, the king increased his efforts in reshuffling the country’s political
elite. However, the biggest measure used was to reform the constitution. On the 9th of March, the
king delivered a speech in which he announced a revision of the 1996 constitution and laid out a
set of points to be addressed through these reforms. The king called for rule of law while promoting
institutions that allow for the separation of powers. After receiving the recommendations of the
Justice and Reconciliation Commission, on 17th of June, the king introduced the new constitution
and announced a national referendum on it only two weeks later. The king made use of this
accelerated and short time period to prevent the opposition from organizing a public debate on it.
Nonetheless, the February 20 Movement boycotted the referendum while describing the
constitution as being imposed “from above”. In response, the state carried out a major media
campaign, while pressuring parties and authorities to participate in the referendum and approve
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the constitutional amendments. This led to a turnout of 73.5% and 98.5% approval of the
constitution. 144
The new constitution had several positive features. It recognized the Tamazight language, spoken
by the Berber population. Citizens were given access to an independent constitutional court that is
no longer presided over by the minister of justice. The monarch would have to select a prime
minister — now called “president of the government” — from the members of the party that won
the election. The new constitution also makes it easier to create fact-finding committees through
easing the requirement to one-third of the chamber rather than a majority. In addressing the
problem of graduate unemployment, the constitution created a Consultative Council on Youth and
Associative Action. Moreover, the king is no longer considered “sacred,” though the “integrity of
his person” is inviolable, a distinction that places no more than a symbolic limitation on his power.
Finally, in line with the earlier created Equity and Reconciliation Commission, which was
appointed to compensate historical victims of human rights abuses, the king has further
incorporated reforms for the promotion of human rights.
Despite these features, the constitution continued to preserve the king’s autonomy. The parliament
remained relatively inaccessible to civil society organizations and its committee meetings were
still held secretly, which guaranteed the limited access to information and the transparency of
parliamentary work. Moreover, for every legislative year, the king presides over the opening
session and addresses the parliament with his political agenda, which cannot be debated and is
used to set a reference for parliamentarians in their discussions. The king can also dissolve
parliament and the parliament does not have oversight over the security services and does not have
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the power to ratify treaties or modify laws without the king’s approval. 145 Overall, despite the
extensive reform measures, which allowed for quelling and outmaneuvering the opposition, the
king continues to hold the real power, rendering these measures only symbolic.
Cooptation
In linchpin monarchies, the opposition plays a bigger role than in dynastic monarchies, as
examined earlier. However, despite the relatively greater role of political parties, they have been
mostly ineffective and coopted. Morocco has active parties from different ideological
backgrounds, reflecting secular, liberal and Islamist groups. However, in both linchpin
monarchies, the opposition is deeply divided as parties fail to cooperate, which has hindered the
formation of broad coalitions that can strengthen the opposition’s capacity to push for
democratization. 146 Following the protests, the king has gradually and strategically opened up the
political space and introduced a degree of pluralism, which allowed for the participation of a broad
range of actors, including conservative/Islamist ones. This led the moderate PJD to win an
unprecedented number of seats in November’s parliamentary elections. The PJD campaigned
against corruption and sought to win the support of February 20th movement. However, as with
historical patterns, the king has used their victory to his gains. While the PJD provided an
alternative to the previously discredited parties, the king, as will be examined in the thesis’s
conclusion has still managed to extend his influence over it.
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These limited liberalization measures and the “divide and rule” strategies were sufficient to
marginalize radical demands formulated by the most dynamic segments. 147 Thus, the king’s
cooptation of the most influential parties led to the faltering of Morocco’s opposition. Despite its
robustness, divisions between the February 20th Movement, the United Socialist Party, and the
Justice and Charity group have contributed to the waning of mobilization and the stability of the
Moroccan monarchy. Thus, activists became split among often radical young demonstrators,
Islamists, and largely coopted political forces that had no incentive to join the protests. 148 The
king, therefore, through integrating political actors into the political space, managed to wither the
movement as well as to maintain his grip over economic, military and ultimately state power.
Repression
In line with his strategy of limited use of repression, King Mohamed VI faced the 2011-12 protests
with limited harsh repression, although he employed low-intensity forms of repression such as
increasing the presence of the police. 149 While not employing violent confrontations as in some
republics, the state has, nonetheless, limited access to public space, harassed activists, carried out
political imprisonment and unfair trials and lowered the levels of freedom of assembly. Amnesty
International has reported that 173 cases of torture and illegal detention occurred during the
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protests. 150 Thus, despite the relative decline in repression preceding the protests under the King,
the protests have prompted a wave of low-intensity repression. 151

3.3.

Conclusion & Post-Uprisings Development

Similar to the pre-uprisings patterns of stabilization, the linchpin monarchies were capable of
surviving their waves of protests with a mixture of legitimation and cooptation policies, which
allowed them to avoid the spill-overs of instability that the Arab uprisings produced. Linchpin
monarchs faced protests with their historical roles as arbiters of the political system, using internal
conflicts to bring them supplementary resources of legitimization. For the king, legitimization has
come at a small price of cosmetic reforms and economic handouts. The constitutional reforms the
state adopted included measures such as delegating authority to the prime minister and expanding
the privileges of the parliament. However, the king retained ultimate power such as overseeing the
military and conducting foreign policy.
Furthermore, while the 2011-12 protests showed that the opposition parties can mobilize the
masses, they also showed that the king’s cooptation measures can divide the opposition by making
parties satisfied with their political gains. This is made possible through the capacity of the
Moroccan structure of contestation to divide the opposition through partially coopting political
actors. 152 If opposition groups are uniformly included or excluded from electoral participation,
political demands as well as population discontent will increase, thereby threatening the
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monarchy’s stability. The monarchy, therefore, influences the nature of opposition dynamics by
offering political reward that is targeted to some groups, but not others. When the opposition is
divided into included and excluded groups, the included parties will not unite with those that are
excluded fearing jeopardizing their position. This collectively weakens the movement for political
reform, while compromising the power of the opposition. 153 Thus, through cooptation of
opposition actors, the Moroccan monarchy’s reforms have been symbolic as they have not changed
the distribution of political power but displayed the responsiveness of the monarchy and
contributed to its popular support.
Nonetheless, while the ineffectiveness of the formal opposition has been a well-established feature
of Moroccan politics, the protests of 2011 and 2012 revealed that the youth cohort, as seen with
their high levels of representation within the 20th of February movement, poses the most
threatening source of resistance, especially due to their higher disposition to radically question of
the monarchy itself. Given the continuing state of economic frustration with poverty and high
unemployment, especially among the youth, the monarchy has struggled to find better strategies
to engage with the youth. However, as they are not formalized into the political system, this leaves
them with only informal channels for mobilization as a tool for contestation.
For the strategy of repression, Morocco, similar to Saudi Arabia, had only deployed it selectively
during the 2011-2012 protests. Rather than outright attacks on protesters, the state has harassed
activists and journalists to deter further protests. However, as with Saudi Arabia, even this targeted
repression may have long-term consequences. Lawrence has found that many protest leaders come
from families that have experience imprisonment due to dissent during the current king’s father,
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Hassan II. She argues that this represents a legacy of repression, which suggests that the current
targeted repression may lead to further unrest in the future. 154 Nonetheless, repression in both
monarchies has succeeded in limiting and deterring immediate dissent. Building on Ritter and
Conrad, it can be explained that, whereas monarchies use repression preemptively and as a
complement to accommodations, republics use it responsively and as an alternative to their
inadequate accommodations. 155 This reaffirms Hafez and Mason and Krane’s work linking the
impact on repression to its sequencing. 156 Furthermore, unlike the indiscriminate use of repression
in republics, monarchies use repression optimally through using it selectively, reaffirming
Khawaja’s linking of the effectiveness of repression to its level of selectivity. 157
In evaluating the outcome of a social movement in realizing its progress, Chenoweth and Stephan
explain that scholars need to examine if the movement has achieved its demands and campaign
objectives. 158 In evaluating February 20th movement, the king appears to be greatest victor of the
February 20th movement, having not only used institutional manipulation to outlast the movement
with his powers unchanged, but also having made it more difficult for opposition to contest his
rule. 159
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Analyzing the developments following the 2011-2012 protests in Morocco reflects the
sustainability and prospects of the king’s continued approach of stability by reform. Following the
constitutional reforms in 2011, the king’s increase in the degree of pluralism has allowed for the
PJD’s parliamentary victory in the 2011 elections. Seven years later, the PJD remains in power,
having won October 2016 parliamentary elections. However, as with the USFP earlier, the PJD
has become another coopted party. The king has weakened the party which has failed to form a
coalition government. In 2017, the king, as a “neutral arbiter”, has dismissed its popular head of
government, Abdelilah Benkirane, who has been the subject of blame by the media and replaced
him with Saadeddine El Othmani, his former foreign minister. 160 Meanwhile, despite the king’s
constitutional reforms and cooptation measures, as growth has been slowed and youth
unemployment remains high, the Moroccan, as is the Jordanian, state continues to face renewed
protests, though the new protests have not managed to solicit the support of as many sectors in
society as those of 2011-12. 161 These persistent socioeconomic challenges may be seen as
signaling the king’s failure to consolidate his power. In addition to employing repression through
arresting protesters and imposing tight restrictions on human rights organizations, the king,
however, deflects these challenges while blaming the opposition, thereby reinforcing the division
of labor between structures of power, which allows economic policies to be used strategically to
delay political reform. 162
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In examining Morocco’s policy responses to popular threats, this thesis has explained that its lack
of sources of unearned revenues has prevented it from engaging in the levels of provision of public
goods as in dynastic monarchies. However, its monarchical, semi-dynastic structure has still
enabled the state to navigate among various political forces and to build crucial coalitions so that
it can stay in power. However, it is questionable whether its strategies of conflict management can
persevere in the face of renewed protests and continue to be effective or whether it will wear out
as has happened in some of the region’s republics.
Herb has argued that, despite having survived earlier challenges, the linchpin monarchies are the
monarchies most likely to democratize, given their little insulation. 163 It can, therefore, be claimed
that, as evidenced by the continuing unrest, Jordan and Morocco are the best positioned
monarchies to yield to further incremental reforms towards greater participation, reform and,
potentially democratization, with parliamentary liberalization being the likely option. Moreover,
in assessing democracy’s prospects in the linchpin monarchies, Stepan et al. use the three variables
of ruling family-size, taxation structure and popular pressure to explain that, while they remain
authoritarian, these regimes present promising relative to other regimes in the region. 164 Similarly,
Yom argues that linchpin monarchies are similar to historically autocratic European kingdoms that
subsequently democratized to become constitutional monarchies such as Denmark and Sweden.
However, he notes that their structures are “permissive, not determinative preconditions” for
democratization. 165
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While they have not historically posed immediate threats to the power of the king, political parties,
through encouraging mass mobilization and a realignment of elite networks, can become more
radical in challenging the king. Frantz and Taylor have argued that, while dictators may set up
parties as a tool to neutralize and counterbalance threats from elite circles, this can, in fact, lead to
democratization since it promotes peaceful mass mobilization, which results in the reconfiguration
of elite dynamics and networks. 166 Moreover, while cooptation can, in the short-run, succeed in
solving the king’s commitment problems, in the long-run, once parties receive the payoffs of
cooptation, there is no guarantee that they will strengthen their own base of power and oppose the
king. 167 In Morocco, as in Saudi Arabia, the commitment to accommodations rests on the threat to
stability. Building on Acemoglu and Robinson, when there’s a credible threat to stability, the elite
will commit to redistribution. However, as this threat diminishes, so will the commitment. 168
On the other hand, the case of Morocco’s coopted opposition can reflect explanations that argue
for distinguishing the dynamics and nature of civil society under authoritarian regimes from those
in established democracies, given the constraints authoritarian regimes place on civil society. 169
To maintain the balance of power between himself and the opposition, the king will have to keep
the opposition fragmented so his capacity of conflict management, negotiated compromise and
threat diffusion can persevere. Alternatively, as reform attempts become exhausted and if the
boundaries of cooptation are reached, the king can either adapt his strategies, possibly relying more
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on repression, or cede more power to the opposition, possibly undermining his capacity of standing
above politics and, therefore, achieving a constitutional monarchy with actual power-sharing.
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Chapter 4. Egypt
4.1.

Historical Survival Strategies

Legitimation
Historically, Arab republics, incapable of using traditional and religious forms of legitimation as
used in monarchies, have relied on ideological and developmentalist forms of legitimation.
However, unlike in the era following independence, in republics such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and
others, the state was suffering from deficits in legitimacy as the popularity of presidents was
declining. Despite being at the center of decision-making, with little connection to the wider
population, presidents were regarded as corrupted autocrats that are secluded from society. 170
With the lack of an ideological legitimacy, republics were witnessing declining electoral
legitimacy with growing perceptions of the futility of presidential and parliamentary elections.
This is reflected in declining voter turnout, with an estimated 23% and 15% in the 2005 and 2010
parliamentary elections, respectively. 171 This led the Egyptian state to carry out several steps
towards political reforms. In 2000, the state allowed the judiciary to supervise the elections as
required by the Egyptian constitution. This was attributed to rising political tensions due to an
economic slump earlier in the Summer before the November elections. 172 Similarly, in 2005,
Mubarak announced that the law on presidential election laws would change to allow for multiple

Bauer, Patricia, and Bertold Schweitzer. "The Egyptian Revolution 2011: Mechanisms of violence and nonviolence." Democracy in Crisis, (2013).
171
International Republican Institute (IRI), 2005 Parliamentary Assessment in Egypt November 15–21,
http://www.iri.org/mena/egypt/pdfs/Egypt%27s%202005%20Parliamentary%20Elections%20Assessment%20Repo
rt.pdf
172
King, Stephen Juan. The new authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa. Indiana University Press,
2009.
170

76

candidates instead of elections through a two-thirds majority of the People’s Assembly, and then,
in a second stage, was confirmed by public referendum. 173
Despite these seemingly positive measures of liberalization, in 2007, constitutional amendments
were introduced which reversed the earlier liberalization gains. These amendments removed
provisions for judicial supervision of elections, gave the president the right to appoint one third of
its members and to dissolve the parliament unilaterally, and included other measures infringing on
human rights and individual freedom. In explaining this inconsistency, Abdulbaki argues that
Mubarak has, paradoxically, yet creatively, mixed democratic and authoritarian elements. 174 Thus,
the political system has adopted a multi-party framework, yet a non-competitive one. Elections are
held, yet with pre-determined outcomes. This mixture, Brumberg argues, has become “not just a
survival strategy”, but a “a type of political system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy any
linear model of democratization”. 175
Furthermore, unlike oil-rich monarchies, republics often lacked external legitimation. After 2003,
the U.S. administration has sought to promote democratic initiatives in the region such as the U.S.–
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Greater Middle East Initiative. With Egypt
being a recipient of US aid and a major regional ally, the Egyptian government was facing pressure
for reforms and for limiting repression. 176
Moreover, historically, legitimacy was derived from the redistribution of rent to the population
through mechanisms of subsidies, public sector jobs, and welfare services. However, with growing
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demographic threats, redistribution was dismantled and much of the population was being left out
as neoliberal reforms favored the regime’s cronies. Thus, the state was also no longer capable of
appeasing much of the middle class as it previously would. By the 2000s, Nasser’s socialist social
contract has eroded as the state was struggling with containing rising labor unrest. Thus, similar to
dynastic, oil-rich monarchies, under historically state-led, developmentalist eras, republics
enjoyed a populist social contract that guaranteed economic legitimacy. However, neoliberal
measures have eroded this contract while leading to a convergence of business and state elites.
Even though presidents sought to promote social and economic reforms, resources were primarily
diverted towards serving the logic of regime maintenance. This has led to neopatrimonial
manipulation of the economy for the service of the political and economic elites. Despite the state’s
efforts in shoring its populist legitimacy by implementing projects for financial compensation, it
was confronted with increasing strikes, since, starting from 2004, the longest wave of worker
protests since World War II in Egypt was taking place. 177
Cooptation
In addition to experiments in multiparty elections and the weakening of state corporatist
organizations, the Egyptian state has used cooptation by including strategic actors within the
political process, while still increasing presidential power. This has made opposition in Egypt serve
a contradictory purpose by performing contentious politics, while reinforcing authoritarianism. 178
Historically, the state has coopted institutions such as trade unions, religious organizations and
political parties. However, by the 1990s, economic reforms were thought to signal the potential
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shift towards a more market-oriented society in which the economic elite would rise in power.
However, while the state’s neoliberal policies gave rise to a technocratic elite, which was leading
the process of policy-making and economic reforms, it was still under presidential auspices. With
neoliberal policies such as privatization, the ruling coalition coopted a growing rent-seeking urban
and rural economic elite. Nonetheless, despite this inclusion, using formal and informal
constraints, the state limited opportunities of the dispersal of power and decision-making beyond
the president. This led to the gradual exclusion of workers and peasants from political participation
as a rising political base of support, symbolized by the National Democratic Party, was used by
the state to prevent elite fragmentation. This policy, therefore, hindered chances of democratization
as declining pluralism and the convergence of interests between the economic and political elites
led to the strengthening of authoritarianism.
Furthermore, in coopting oppositional groups such as the Islamists, the state has faced restrictions
in its capacity of formally including them within the political system. In contrasting the
containment strategies of Egypt and Morocco towards Islamists, Albrecht and Wegner highlight
how the institutional structure in each has allowed Morocco to succeed in coopting Islamists while
Egypt has failed. 179 In both, the state has allowed for the political participation of Islamists.
However, the nature of this inclusion has varied, with the formal inclusion of Islamists in Morocco
and informal inclusion in Egypt. Similar to other republics such as Tunisia and Algeria, the
Egyptian state has adopted a policy of “minimal toleration and formal restriction” towards
Islamists, repressing the radicals such as the Jama‘a Islamiyya while cautiously tolerating the
moderates, mainly the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Under Mubarak, the MB faced restrictions in
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their ability to have a political party, which undermined their organizational capacities.
Nonetheless, MB members took part in parliamentary elections as independent candidates.
However, if they were to become threatening, the state would crackdown, which was demonstrated
in the arbitrary arrest of MB prominent activists in the run-up of the 1995 and 2000 parliamentary
elections. Thus, as pattern of accommodation of the Egyptian state towards Islamists demonstrates,
the legalization of Islamists is only undertaken if it will not pose a risk to the elite’s survival.
In explaining the structure of contestation in Egypt, Albrecht and Wegner argue that “competition
takes place between distinct—in themselves rather homogenous—pillars of the state, i.e. between
the military, the religious world of al-Azhar, ‘civil society’, and the political realm of the
authoritarian system, that is parliament and government”. 180 Thus, in Egypt, the state’s crisis of
legitimacy meant that the inclusion of opposition can potentially challenge the state’s power. This
necessitated the state’s maintenance of hegemonic rule and limited pluralism in such institutions
as the parliament, which meant that cooptation could not be effectively used in Egypt as in
Morocco. Overall, despite domestic and international pressure, the president only symbolically
ceded power to civil society or to other branches of government and the opening of political space
would be interrupted if it leads to actual contestation to the balance of power.
Repression
Arab republics haven historically deployed repression consistently to counter threatening actors.
Despite policies of liberalization, repression in Egypt was increasingly deployed in the 1990s.
Even though it was initially targeted at the violence of the Islamic Group, it later extended to civil
society. Repression became institutionalized with amendments to the penal code, press law,
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publications law and other legislations governing institutions such as the media, professional
syndicates and trade unions. For example, Law 93 of 1995 significantly widened the definition of
crimes such as the propagation of false information and punished citizens convicted of these crimes
more severely. Low-intensity repression was also used as the government restricted the media as
well, with Reporters Without Borders placing Egypt 143rd out of 167 nations on press freedoms. 181
In addition to limiting challenges to the state, these policies were used to allow for the smooth
implementation of economic liberalization, especially privatization. 182
Repression in Egypt has been often portrayed with the persistence of the state of emergency, which
allowed the government to control and contain political opposition, suspend the constitution, and
expand the powers of the president. 183 In addition to allowing for such violations such as arbitrary
detention, preventing assemblies, and restricting human rights, the emergency law has also
hindered the implementation of rule of law as it allowed the president to issue decrees that enjoyed
the same status as official laws. This led to passing of laws restraining individuals’ rights under
the banner of anti-terrorism.
Repression was used by the state to counter any political challenges to survival. Thus, in 2005,
with the state’s first multiple-candidate presidential elections, the presidential candidate, Ayman
Nour, was imprisoned. Similarly, despite allowing space for civil society, the state arrested human
rights activists such as Saad Eddine Ibrahim. Moreover, with neoliberal policies leading to
widening inequalities, repression was frequently used against labor unrest and opposition groups.
While it was often used relatively subtly and sparingly to protect the state’s liberal veneer, with
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rising protests in the years preceding the uprisings, there was an increasingly heavy deployment
of the security forces. With the increasing use of repression and with increasing police brutality,
however, the effectiveness of repression was waning. 184 This led to the emergence of new social
movements, which ultimately contributed to the onset of the uprisings.

4.2.

Survival Strategies during the Protests

Starting in late 2010, major anti-government demonstrations started in Tunisia and spread to the
republics of Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and to a lesser extent in Algeria, Sudan, and Iraq. In
Egypt, economic woes and social frustration have resulted in protests that preceded the uprisings
and have led for the first time to widespread public calls for alternatives to Mubarak. Bishara
explains that, in the face of this rising discontent, rather than providing concessions, the state has
often simply ignored the protests, while dismissing and marginalizing their demands as selfish and
“sectoral”. 185 When the uprisings in Egypt were triggered in 2011, similar to monarchies,
demonstrators called for socioeconomic programs and political reforms such as reducing
corruption, ending state-of-emergency laws, and addressing the poor living conditions for the
average Egyptian. However, unlike monarchies, regime change was the primary demand. Similar
to trends in Morocco as well as across the region, protests started with youth groups from a variety
of ideological leanings calling for a day of revolt on the day coinciding with National Police Day
as a sign of opposition to police brutality. This led to an escalation as large-scale opposition
movements as well as non-ideological ordinary people joined and occupied public space. The
sections below explain how the state has responded to these popular protests.
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Legitimation
With increasing protests and mounting pressure, Mubarak provided several concessions to appease
the protesters. Mubarak reshuffled the cabinet and set up a committee to propose constitutional
changes. He also delegated some of his powers to his newly appointed vice president. State
television also reported that judicial officials would investigate three former government ministers
and a senior ruling party official on corruption charges. 186 More importantly, in a speech that
Mubarak gave to address the protesters, he announced that he will not be seeking re-election in
September, signaling the transfer of power within a guided and orderly timetable. Two days later,
it was announced that the president’s son, Gamal Mubarak, who was widely seen as succeeding
him, will not run for elections.
With limited and discredited internal as well as external legitimacy, Mubarak’s attempts, however,
failed as protesters continued to occupy the streets and demand the immediate resignation of the
president. 187 Thus, when confronted with popular protests, presidents’ concessions failed to
provide the state with renewed legitimation as the state suffered from little credibility in
implementing policies as well as promises of gradual reforms.
Cooptation
With limited financial and institutional capacity, Mubarak failed to diffuse power and distribute
privileges to pacify threatening actors. Mubarak called on demonstrators and organizations such
as the Muslim Brotherhood for "dialogue" and "national reconciliation". However, such measures
had little success as they were worn out. Moreover, since neoliberal reforms have broken down
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the state’s populist and clientelist "social pact", measures were implemented to reinstate state
privileges. Thus, in an attempt to appease state employees, the government announced that salaries
and pensions will be raised by 15% by April for the 6 million people on Egypt's public payroll.
This would cost an estimated $960 million. 188 This, however, failed to address the protesters and
had limited success.
More importantly, Mubarak couldn’t maintain power due to his failure in coopting the military. In
monarchies such as Morocco, stability was achieved through restructuring state institutions to
promote intra-elite competition. This prevented any certain elite to threaten the ruler’s power.
However, in Egypt, the military, which had historically contributed to Mubarak’s support base,
was turning against him in the period preceding the revolution as it distrusted Gamal Mubarak,
who was rising in power and being groomed as Mubarak’s successor. With rising protests,
Mubarak was faced with a shift in the balance of power between the military and the NDP. With
little incentive to support Mubarak, the military’s refusal to fire on protesters reflected Mubarak’s
failure in coopting the military, Unlike in monarchies, Mubarak was not capable of controlling
elite fragmentation. Thus, Mubarak’s failure of thwarted his desire for his son’s succession as well
as ultimately led him to cede power to the military.
Repression
Across republics, the use of repression was a decisive factor in influencing the outcome of protests,
which showed how the regime’s capacity and propensity for repression have proven central to its
survival. Examining repression patterns from the the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights
Data Project reveals that Egypt, in addition to Yemen, Libya, Tunisia and Syria, have all witnessed
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decline in the level of physical integrity rights, with all having the least possible score in 2011,
except for Tunisia. 189
Across republics, the increase in repression signaled the failure of the traditional mix of cooptation
and legitimation to provide stability. In Egypt, although the uprisings were initially celebrated as
a non-violent, peaceful revolution, an estimated 846 people were killed by security forces in
violent clashes during the 18 days of protests. 190 As protests began and demonstrators marched to
Tahrir square, tanks rolled into the streets and riot police fired dozens of teargas canisters at
protesters to prevent access to the square, but with little effect. Moreover, journalists, activists as
well as protesters were arrested and detained, while army units increased their presence throughout
strategic locations. Mubarak ordered the Minister of Interior to use live ammunition, but the head
of the security forces refused. This disagreement between Mubarak and his top commanders
proved central in leading to his downfall.
Despite this disagreement, one notable incidence of violence took place on February 2nd when the
state mobilized gangs of thugs to organize counterdemonstrations to boost the state’s legitimacy.
Rather than holding peaceful protests, pro-Mubarak forces rushed into Tahrir square on horses and
camels to disperse the protesters with their sticks and whips. This represented the state’s strategy
to undermine the protesters through indiscriminate violence reoccupy public space. In what
became known as the “Camel incident”, 11 people died and over 600 were injured. However,
rather than deter the protesters and restore order, the state’s excessive use of force furthered its
delegitimization and pushed the military to defect from its support to Mubarak. This resulted in
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the downgrading of the state’s authoritarian survival strategies and would contribute to its
breakdown. 191 The battle of the camel, therefore, is a case in point of the inability of the ruling
coalition to effectively use repression and to exercise authority over the military.
In examining the military’s defection, several factors have contributed to aligning the military’s
interests in conflict with those of Mubarak. During the uprisings, the extent of mass protest
signaled a legitimacy crisis and a potentially imminent leadership change, which meant that the
military’s support for Mubarak would potentially delegitimize the military itself. Moreover, in
addition to the historical failure of Mubarak to coopt the military, as examined in the previous
section, Mubarak’s favoring of the Ministry of Interior over the military meant that the military’s
corporate interests were undermined under Mubarak. Under Mubarak, even though the military
continued to represent a core pillar of Mubarak’s support base, the state increasingly relied on the
State Security Intelligence (SSI) which operated under the Ministry of Interior. 192 This has turned
Egypt into a police state rather than a military state. Mubarak blocked efforts of reform of the SSI
while allowing them to enjoy special privileges and exclusive powers, which guaranteed that
repression would be used to quell any challenges to stability. With the uprisings, the state resorted
to the military as the Ministry of Interior proved inadequate in responding to the protests.
Following a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces with the notable absence of the
president as its supreme commander on 10th of February, Mubarak had to issue his resignation the
following day 193. Thus, unlike republics such as Libya, Syria and Yemen, despite Mubarak’s
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willingness for the use of force, the Egyptian government, along with that of Tunisia, failed to
coerce the military into the use repression.

4.3.

Conclusion & Post-Uprisings Development

With the onset of the Arab uprisings, mass protests erupted across several republics in the region,.
In examining how the uprisings unfolded, Scheitzer argues that, in the leadup to the uprisings,
traditional survival strategies in republics were becoming worn out as economic difficulties and
growing political opposition have rendered them ineffective. 194 Whereas monarchies only
witnessed demonstration with no regime change, the greater demands witnessed in republics made
extracting concessions from the state unlikely. While there is greater variation amongst republics
than monarchies, in republics that witnessed mass-protests, states were constrained in their choice
of strategy.
As was demonstrated in the case of Egypt, legitimation was worn out and the state failed to coopt
strategic actors, most notably the military. Repression was, therefore, the last resort and, counterproductively often resulted in further delegitimization. This demonstrates that repression reflects
the state’s weakness. This was explained by Ayubi who argued that repression manifests the state’s
weakness in achieving its goals using economic incentives and persuasion. With a rentier economy
and the lack of rule of law, the use of repression by Arab regimes reflects their last resort for
stability and their struggle to maintain their monopoly of the use of violence. 195 Thus, with limited
choices of survival strategies, Mubarak had to step down signaling the Egyptian state breakdown.
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Similar patterns have taken place in other republics. The political trajectories of republics has
varied more than that of monarchies. With the exception of Tunisia, republics that have endured
uprisings have experienced a variety of outcomes, yet they have neither democratized nor have
they completely returned to the old authoritarian order. Nonetheless, despite the variation in the
repertoire of survival strategies within republics owing to their different institutional structures,
republics are more likely to use repression when confronted with popular threats given their limited
capacity of legitimation and cooptation. In Syria, the initially peaceful civil uprising escalated
when security forces opened fire on protesters, which led to the rise of an armed insurgency, and
ultimately mushroomed into a civil war. Similarly, in Yemen and in Libya, repression of
demonstrations led to growing protests, especially more violent ones, thereby also escalating to
civil wars. In Tunisia, similar to Egypt, the state’s failure to coopt the military led to its breakdown.
However, unlike Egypt, Tunisia’s transition has been smoother and led to a more pluralistic and
democratic outcome than that of Egypt. In explaining this divergence, Bellin argues that “while
Tunisia’s advantaged socio-economic position was certainly an asset, pointing the country in a
more democratic direction, it cannot account for the radically divergent political trajectories
observed in the two countries”. 196 Rather, it was the differences in institutional endowments that
proved central in leading to divergent outcomes. In Egypt, the military’s size and legacy of political
engagement, in addition to its privileged, unconstrained position in society has led to continuing
instability, as reflected in the 2013 coup and in the rising reliance for repression as a survival
strategy. On the other hand, Tunisia’s small, professional and apolitical military has allowed for
the institutionalization of civilian state, thereby promoting a smoother and more successful
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transition. This demonstrates the leading role state institutions play in influencing transition
outcomes.
In further examining how institutions can impact the ability of regimes to reconstruct their
authoritarian strategies, Egypt’s post-uprisings trajectory presents several important findings.
Following the overthrow of Mubarak, power struggle emerged as competing elites sought to
dominate the political sphere. Nonetheless, in the immediate developments of Mubarak’s
resignation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which represents a council of the
top military officers, came to dominate. Following the resignation of Mubarak, the military moved
to dissolve the NDP while putting in trial members of the old regime on grounds of financial
corruption. The military, however, used the transitional period to guarantee that it would maintain
its power. For example, in 2012, the SCAF pushed for a referendum to replace the old constitution
with a new one that gives it legal sanction and allows for the trials of civilians before military
courts. 197
To understand these developments, however, requires analyzing the cost of stability on Egypt’s
stifled political society under Mubarak’s form of liberalized autocracy. Even after his absence,
Mubarak’s legacy on state institutions has greatly influenced the Egypt’s transitional trajectory.
With historically weakened and coopted opposition and civil society, the Muslim Brotherhood,
having been the most robust and organizationally successful oppositional group under Mubarak,
despite being formally excluded from the political sphere, rose to power. 198 Their reign, however,
was cut short in a popular coup when the military once again switched its alliance and overthrew
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Morsi in 2013. The military’s resurgence in Egypt’s political transition is linked to its accumulated
power under Mubarak’s patronage as well as its support from state institutions, which, along with
the state’s bureaucracy, were embedded within clientelist, loyal networks with deeply entrenched
interests in the continuation of the status quo. 199
After the 2013 coup, Egypt has backslid as it witnessed reversals of the 2011 gains and experienced
setbacks in its democratic institutions, making it decline in Freedom House’s index from “Partly
Free” to “Not Free”. 200 This is reflected in the state’s attempt at re-establishing authoritarian
structures through the reconstruction of the survival strategies that broke down during the
uprisings. After 2013, the state has sought to legitimize itself through economic measures with
new projects such as the expansion of the Suez Canal, the new capital and other measures aimed
at stimulating the economy and improving popular perceptions. However, the renewed use of
neoliberal policies without an economic vision and with no institutional reform has exacerbated
economic conditions, leading to declining legitimacy. 201 The state has also deployed religious and
nationalistic narratives as media campaigns have praised the state’s heroic war against terrorism
and religious extremism. However, with the crackdown on civil society, the closing of public space
and growing repression, the state’s internal and external legitimacy has also faced growing
deficits. 202

Roll, Stephan. "Managing change: how Egypt’s military leadership shaped the transformation." Mediterranean
Politics 21, no. 1 (2016): 23-43.
200
House, Freedom. Freedom in the world 2014: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties. Rowman &
Littlefield, 2014.
201
Joya, Angela. "Neoliberalism, the state and economic policy outcomes in the post-arab uprisings: the case of
Egypt." Mediterranean Politics 22, no. 3 (2017): 339-361.
202
Abdelrahman, Maha. "Policing neoliberalism in Egypt: the continuing rise of the ‘securocratic’state." Third
World Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2017): 185-202.
199

90

More than previous governments, the use of repression in Egypt since 2013 has sharply increased
as the state has used fear as a strategy for polarization while using a populist discourse of national
security to militarize the state and reassert its monopoly on the use of violence and revive its
historical role as the “guardian of the nation”. 203 Thus, while repression under Mubarak’s state of
emergency was considered extra-legal, the Sisi government has institutionalized and provided
legal backing for violations with laws such as the NGO Law, Penal Code, Terrorism Law, Military
Court Law, and the Protest Law, which have made the security apparatus above the law. This has
made repression a regular feature of Egyptian politics as human rights violations such as forced
disappearances, unlawful arrests, arbitrary detention, and torture in custody go unrecorded. 204
Scheitzer explains that “the extent of the effort to obtain legitimation is mirrored by the extent of
repression of all kinds of real or assumed opponents or regime critics, currently at an all-time high,
and now also directed against the middle class”. 205 Meanwhile, the state has focused on coopting
the military along with state institutions such as the judiciary and the parliament through clientelist
rent redistribution and power diffusion. The cooptation of these strategic actors guarantees their
loyalty as their economic advantages counterbalance the threat from the growing use of repression
and preempts any potential wave of protests. This reflects the state’s attempts to prevent collective
action and minimize the risk of the threat of unrest so that it can avoid a breakdown. 206
The re-autocratization of the Egypt in recent years questions if the regime has, in fact, experienced
a breakdown in 2011. The post-2013 government has displayed several notable changes from the
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pre-uprisings government as it reconstructs its authoritarian strategies and reorganizes its balance
of power. Rather than a revolution, the 2011 uprisings can be seen to represent a crisis of
authoritarian rule at a time of leadership change. Consequently, rather than a regime breakdown,
Egypt can be seen to reflect a case of state failure. While not as severe as in other republics, with
a governing elite using the state apparatus for its own survival, Egypt has experienced degrees of
state failure as the state fails to fulfill basic functions of law, order, and security. 207
In contextualizing this trajectory among other republics that were also confronted with popular
protests, it is notable that, across the republics that faced challenges, when repression was used as
the primary strategy, especially when it was used indiscriminately and excessively against
unarmed citizens, the state faced instability and failed in subverting popular protests successfully.
This substantiates the proposition that, while raising the costs of contestation in the short-run,
repression does not reduce the propensity for dissent in the long-run. 208 Since repression does not
address the root of popular grievances, it only delays contestation rather than eliminating it.
Moreover, the excessive reliance on repression by republics reaffirms that repression is used when
there are no alternative strategies. As repression entails strengthening the security apparatus, this
creates new risks, as a strong military increases the likelihood of coups. 209 In addressing this,
Geddes has theorized that when militaries rise to power, they carry with them “the seeds of their
own destruction”. 210 Moreover, as the state allocates more resources to staving off unrest, it
relinquishes its capacity to provide public goods, risking state failure. This results in popular
delegitimization, leading the state to rely more on its coopted elite for support. While the future of
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stability in Egypt is unpredictable, since autocratic rulers must do more than just avert rebellion,
it can be deduced from this thesis that, rather than clinging to its traditional repertoire of survival
strategies, the Egyptian state, more than the other cases examined here, has to adapt itself to
upgrade its authoritarian strategies, given the shortcomings of its strategies and its limited capacity
for maneuver, if it is to stay in power.
Within this context of the growing reliance on repression as a survival strategy across republics
that have witnessed protests, with the exception of Tunisia, the Arab uprisings signal the renewal
of the traditional social contract that defined state-society relations. In the traditional and historical
social contract, legitimacy was derived from the redistribution of rent to the population through
mechanisms of subsidies, public sector jobs, among others. However, with growing demographic
threats, much of the population was being left out as neoliberal reforms favored the regime’s
cronies. After the uprisings, in exchange for the lack of political participation and rule of law,
national and individual security have come to the fore, thereby substituting socioeconomic
provisions and leading to greater militarization and repression by the state. In the following
chapter, the thesis situates these shifts within the broader theoretical framework. The thesis also
concludes by examining the significance, implications and limitations of the thesis’s findings.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis through summing up its findings, analyzing their relevance to
today’s political developments as well their significance, implications and limitations. This thesis
has sought to apply the analytical framework of survival strategies on the category of regime types
to explore the different patterns in which autocrats respond to threats to their stability. In this
process, the thesis has sought to engage in the debates on the dictator’s “toolkit” through showing
how the structure of the state influences how autocrats can selectively employ authoritarian
strategies while also conditioning their adaptability in withstanding shocks to their stability. This
thesis has focused on the monarchy-republic distinction as the most salient regime type. While
several scholars have examined the durability of Arab monarchies relative to republics through the
frameworks of rentierism, culture, and hereditary succession, 211 this thesis has sought to break
down these claims and offer a more nuanced account that examines the relationships between these
institutions and the channels through which they impact different patterns of survival.

5.1. Limitations
This thesis has faced several limitations. First, in focusing on regime type, this thesis didn’t take
into consideration other variables which also influence how states achieve stability. For example,
variables such as the level of inequality, neopatrimonialism, institutionalization, and sectarianism
also impact stability and influence which strategy the state uses. Similarly, within one regime type,
there are states that are strong and others that are weak. This variation impacts the state’s capacity
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in enforcing law and achieving stability. Thus, treating countries across the same regime type
equally would assume that states are equally coherent and functioning. Nonetheless, while regime
type is only one of several variables that explain patterns of stability, it has significant explanatory
power as it shapes the nature of state institutions, governance and the distribution of power.
Secondly, since this thesis has adopted a primarily structural approach in which states are viewed
as rational, calculating actors that make use of available resources and opportunity structures to
prolong their survival, it has devoted its analysis to state survival strategies while not giving as
much attention to the nature and dynamics of social movements. The relationship between the
state’s authoritarian strategies and social movements is a dynamic and bidirectional one, making
a study that solely focuses on either risk falling into a structural deterministic framework. In
recognizing the dynamic relationship between these two, the thesis has accounted for the variation
in levels of protests across the cases while subsuming the motivation for such variation under
differences in the nature of the state’s legitimacy. Nonetheless, rather than treating the social
movements as an exogenous variable, approaches to uprisings need to include them as strategic
actors who adapt just like the state. Thus, this thesis is limited in that it doesn’t examine how social
movements function and maneuver differently around the strategies of cooptation, repression, and
legitimation used by authoritarian regimes.
Furthermore, this thesis has focused mainly on threats from mass movements. However, there are
other types of threats, mainly those from within the ruling elite and those that come from outsiders
within society. Further research should account for different sources and levels of threats and how
each influences the nature of the state’s response. Similarly, in examining the variation in
authoritarian strategies, this thesis has compared historical strategies in times of stability to
strategies during periods of crises and high levels of oppositional threats. However, comparisons
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of state responses to crises across similar periods of unrest can provide opportunities for further
research on the variation in authoritarian strategies.
Methodologically, the thesis faced limitations in the lack of data, which makes it difficult
accurately measure such variables as legitimacy, cooptation, dynasticism, or rentierism. While a
large-N, statistical approach can potentially yield more robust relationships on the different
impacts of the variables of dynasticism and rentierism on choice of strategy, the use of proxies to
capture complex concepts is imperfect, but it provides a second-best approach for the purposes of
comparative insight.
Another methodological limitation arises from the difficulty involved in analytically
disaggregating the impact of dynasticism from rentierism since dynastic monarchies are also oilrich. Thus, given how the available cases don’t display sufficient variation, it is difficult to test
alternative hypotheses. Similarly, in examining the variable of dynasticism, while the typology of
Herb provides useful insights in uncovering the roots of absolutism in different forms of
monarchies, it occasionally falls into oversimplified generalizations that fail to capture political
dynamics within intermediate cases. For example, despite its hereditary status, in Kuwait, people
outside of the royal family have historically played a large role in key political issues, including
succession. This has made it into a constitutional monarchy with a semi-democratic system.
Similarly, in the United Arab Emirates, the historical development of the federal system of
governance has allowed for the emirs to enjoy levels of autonomy in local politics that is
uncommon in other monarchies. These cases are overlooked in Herb’s analysis. Despite these
limitations, the thesis’s findings remain relevant. The section below discusses the theoretical
implications of the thesis through framing the case-comparison within broader debates as covered
in the literature review.
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5.2. Theoretical Implications
In comparing the ability of the different cases examined in deploying the three strategies to respond
to the protests, this section revisits the theoretical debates explained in the literature review and
presents several findings on the relevance of Herb’s regime typology in explaining different
authoritarian strategies. In comparing linchpin to dynastic, oil-rich monarchies, the ability of
dynastic, oil-rich to buy off social peace may suggest that it is resource endowments that is the
defining variable in influencing the choice of survival strategies. In this narrative, it is because
Morocco lacks the means to buy off its opposition that it must maintain a degree of tolerance
towards the opposition and rely on strategies of political legitimation and elite cooptation to
stabilize. Similarly, it is because of Saudi Arabia’s post-uprisings declining rent revenues that it
has resorted to strategies of political legitimation.
While the variable of resource abundance enables autocrats to stave off unrest, it only, however,
serves as an intermediate variable that is mediated through the impact of domestic political
institutions, which determine how the resources are allocated. Where mechanisms of elite
management and dispute resolution are absent, resource wealth has given rise to extractive
institutions headed by corrupted, personalist autocrats such as in Iraq and Iran, which have not
proved as durable as monarchical, rentierist regimes. Furthermore, in states with decentralized
authority such as Libya, resource wealth has promoted the possibility of conflict for the
monopolization of rent revenues. Moreover, Herb argues that, “opportunism is a problem money
cannot eliminate”. With no dynasticism, there is no guarantee of loyalty for a rentier leader, which
can encourage the army to overthrow him. Herb reflects on the several threats King Hassan faced
during his rule to explain that, to appease the military, the Moroccan king has had to enjoy popular
public opinion, otherwise, there is a risk for a military coup. This contrasts with how the senior
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posts within Saudi Arabia's National Guard is filled with loyal royal family members, which
eliminates the risk of coups.
In Saudi Arabia, rentierism has merged with dynasticism which has reinforced the mismatch
between the process of socioeconomic development and the resilience of authoritarianism in Saudi
Arabia can be represented by examining the interrelationship between dynasticism and rentierism,
as symbolized by the role of oil in shaping the royal family’s institutionalization of the state.
Traditionally, socioeconomic modernization fragments traditional elites, as technocrats,
industrialists and labor power challenge the premodern power structure. In rentier oil-rich states,
the abundance of oil has allowed for rapid modernization without disrupting the traditional elite of
the royal family. This has allowed them to maintain high levels of legitimacy, but it has also
strengthened the state vis-à-vis the society, which has undermined the formation of a civil society.
Thus, while dynasticism offers the possibility of economic legitimation, its institutional
inflexibility hinders the potential for partial liberalization through measures of cooptation as in
Morocco. Even though dynasticism has allowed for a populist social contract that achieves stability
through the redistribution of resources, it has undermined the institutionalization of formal avenues
for contestation as such measures would compromise the internal cohesion of the dynasty. Thus,
despite measures taken by the Saudi monarchy for implementing municipal elections, the
domination of the state by the family conflicts with constitutionalization of power-sharing
mechanisms such as pluralistic parliamentary systems and well-developed oppositional
movements. This is due, not just to the absence of taxation, as the rentierism paradigm holds, but
also to the dynastic nature of the monarchy which constrains its capacity of cooptation in dealing
with the threat of oppositional contestation. In sum, while the Moroccan king’s stability rests on
the intra-elite competition promoted through the mix of partial liberalization and electoral
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manipulation, that of Saudi Arabia rests on the internal cohesion that is provided by the royal
family’s domination preventing the emergence of competing elites. These findings reaffirm that
there is variation between different forms of monarchies that goes beyond the presence of oil,
which theories of monarchical exceptionalism should take into account.
While comparing dynastic and linchpin monarchies highlights the different impacts of dynasticism
and rentierism on authoritarian strategies, comparing dynastic monarchies to republics can
highlight how the historically institutionalized structures of family-based governance have enabled
the dynastic monarchies that cannot be replicated in republics without instability. Thus, with Syria
having historically set the trend, across republics such as Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, given the
limited institutionalization for rule-based political procedures, long-standing presidents have
historically sought to consolidate their power through perpetuating the influence of their sons. As
demonstrated by the Arab uprisings, however, this has often had adverse implications on the
durability of these regimes and on the stability of these autocrats. Since republics have no
constitutional justification for family-based governance, such measures were not perceived as
legitimate and often disturbed the traditional balance of power, which led to elite splits. This lack
of mechanisms to reduce the uncertainty involved in the transfer of power within republics
contrasts with the certainty of dynasticism in Gulf monarchies, which contributes to the varying
levels of stability in each. This also reaffirms the primacy of dynasticism in establishing the
legitimacy of monarchies, which consolidates their stability.
On the other hand, comparing linchpin monarchies to republics shows that, even though both
Morocco and Egypt lack the rentierist social contract of Saudi Arabia and share similar levels of
income per capita, the Moroccan king is still able to enjoy a level of institutional flexibility and
bargaining power that allows for his legitimation and cooptation strategies to be effective, unlike
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those of Mubarak. In republics, personalist leaders with dominant single-parties have traditionally
used patronage networks to politicize state institutions, coopt civil servants and the military, and
repress dissidents. This has led to the formations of cults of personality around presidents, which
has contributed to legitimating their centralized political systems while weakening other
institutions. Similar to monarchs, personalist leaders have sought to exploit these weak institutions
to establish their legitimacy by reinforcing the relationship between stability and their survival,
which has produced a form of legitimacy that is derived from security and order. However, with
limited mechanisms of elite management, presidents have failed to consolidate their power as
effectively as monarchs. In Egypt, the military’s semi-autonomy along with an increasingly
threatening opposition have constrained the power of the president in his satisfying his dynastic
aspirations. By contrast, the Moroccan king is able to establish a balance of securing its hold on
power while containing oppositional threats in a way that Egypt’s institutional structure doesn’t
allow. Thus, despite the concentration of power in the centralized presidential system, presidents
have not been able to establish their hegemony across the state’s institutions as in monarchies,
which has challenged their ability in accommodating compromises and coopting outside actors,
pushing them to resort to repression for their survival.

5.3. Conclusion
The analysis above shows that, across the cases, in the years following the uprisings, challenges
to stability continue which have pushed rulers to find other means to meet the demands of the
electorate and to elicit their cooperation. More than just popular challenges, these qualitative
changes stem from political, social and economic changes, which necessitate the renewal of the
social contract that defines state-society relations. Despite the divergence in outcomes that has
resulted from the uprisings, it has pushed states to adopt regressive policies in the short-run, while
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possibly altering their repertoire of survival in the long-run. In republics, with the exception of
Tunisia, the uprisings have resulted in multiple adverse trajectories from authoritarian
retrenchment to state collapse, civil war, and intensified ethno-religious or identity conflicts. This
has pushed even states that have not experienced regime change to undergo institutional change as
they absorb the lessons of the uprisings and learn from other cases, which changes the nature of
governance as well as of contestation. As states learn from each other, republican as well as
monarchical governments across the region have adopted similar policies of using nationalist
discourses to consolidate their power while dehumanizing and framing protesters as conspirators,
restricting access to public space, increasing suspicion of foreign interference, among other
exclusionary measures. 212 These policies have led the region to have the worst global ratings in
2017’s Freedom House’s index.213
This reflects a limitation in the traditional transition paradigm in explaining developments
following the Arab uprisings. Rather than approaching the process of transition as a teleological,
unidirectional sequence and the issues of democratization and authoritarian resilience as opposing
paradigms, studies of authoritarian states should recognize the variety of hybrid authoritarian
regimes in the region and should dedicate more attention to this grey zone as well as to the state’s
shifting strategies lurking behind the façade of stability to better distinguish the variety of
authoritarian mechanisms of reproduction. Starting in the 1990s, Arab states adopted partial
liberalization measures so they can evolve and restructure their institutions as they confronted
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pressures of globalization and democratization. With new local, regional and global pressures
today, states are again pushing to adapt and shift their authoritarian strategies to survive.
Almost eight years into the Arab uprisings, the underlying conditions that prompted the protests
remain. In examining the modest, even grim and disturbing, developments that the uprisings have
produced, this thesis suggests that the state’s contemporary as well as historical authoritarian
strategies play a leading role in influencing these developments. While some states have managed
to upgrade their strategies and outmaneuver social movements and achieve stability, others broke
down as the effectiveness of their strategies wore down and they faced constraints in adapting their
repertoire of strategies. Rather than attributing the variation in patterns of stability to the personal
accomplishments or failures of its leadership or its opposition, this thesis shows that it was the
state’s institutional structure that led to the divergence in the outcomes of the Arab uprisings. These
structures predate the uprisings and show that the state’s institutional design constrains the state’s
agency while shaping and reinforcing different patterns of entrenchment of autocratic rule. Since
institutions evolve, states will have to adapt their strategies and reinvent their repertoires so that
they can achieve stability.
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